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FOREWORD
This report is the culmination of a year-long investigation of the avionics
architecture for an Entry Research Vehicle (ERV). The work was performed under the
direction of NASA's Langley Research Center by the Charles Stark Draper Laboratory,
Inc. (CSDL). Messrs. Howard Stone and Charles Meissner were the the NASA contract
monitors for the program. Funding was provided under contract NASI-18061, Task
Assignment 7.
The Entry Research Vehicle is conceived to be an unmanned, autonomous
spacecraft to be deployed from the Shuttle. It will perform various aerodynamic and
propulsive maneuvers in orbit and land at Edwards AFB after a 5 - 10 hour mission.
Preliminary study of the vehicle's avionic architecture was performed by CSDL under Task
Assignment Number 1 of the same contract in the Spring of 1986. This follow-on study
detailed the design and furthered the analysis of the architecture. This report describes in
detail the avionics architecture proposed by CSDL and its subsequent reliability analysis.
Much of the work reported here has been informally released as part of the ERV
memo series. The presentation of those documents here supercedes all previous releases of
them.
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INTRODUCTION
1.0 INTRODUCTION
The Entry Research Vehicle (ERV) concept was designed to be an experimental
spacecraft operating in the mid-1990s. It would be a small, unmanned, autonomous
vehicle deployed from the Space Shuttle. As such, the ERV would be used to demonstrate
the operational capabilities of future NASA and USAF reusable orbital transportation
systems (including Shuttle II). To meet these goals, the ERV mission plans include
various propulsive and aerodynamic maneuvers during deorbit and reorbit phases.
After deployment from the Shuttle, a typical ERV mission will involve two to three
Earth orbits during which the flight experiments will be performed. Mission durations are
expected to be on the order of five hours. Missions are terminated with a reentry phase to
glide landing at a dry lake bed in Southern California (Edwards AFB). Approximately five
to ten missions for the single vehicle are proposed.
To perform its myriad of flight maneuvers, the ERV will require an extremely
accurate guidance, navigation, and control (GN&C) system. Because of the hazards in-
volved in the ERV flight (Shuttle proximity, autonomous landing near populated areas) and
the high cost of vehicle (upwards of $100 million), a second principal requirement of the
GN&C system is that of extremely low probability of failure resulting in vehicle loss. For
worst case missions, the required probability of vehicle/mission loss due to avionic failure
must be less than 10 -6.
In the Spring of 1986, the Charles Stark Draper Laboratory (CSDL) was contracted
by NASA's Langley Research Center to perform preliminary avionic design studies for the
ERV. That three-month initiative resulted in a strawman architecture for the ERV flight
computer and associated inputs and outputs (I/O). The architecture was based upon the
Advanced Information Processing System (AIPS) methodology for developing ultra-reli-
able computing machinery. AIPS, which is also being developed at CSDL and sponsored
by NASA, approaches ultra-reliability requirements as a fault-tolerance problem, i.e., de-
signing a system which can detect, isolate, and reconfigure itself around failed elements.
The proposed design for the ERV avionics consisted of a centralized AIPS Fault-
Tolerant Processor with triply redundant distributed MIL-STD-1553 buses serving as the
primary I/O ports to the vehicle subsystems. The initial studies completed that spring in-
cluded performance and packaging specifications for the ERV avionics; software specifica-
tions for the guidance, navigation, and control of the vehicle; as well as guidance and navi-
Avionics Architecture Studies for the Entry Research Vehicle 1 1
INTRODUCTION
gation algorithm design and simulation. The final report from that work was published in
April, 1986 [Kriegsman et al].
In August of 1986, NASA/Langley awarded CSDL this foUow-on contract to refine
the ERV avionics suite design. Specifically, two major issues in the ERV architecture have
been studied:
1. System design and implementation to module level,
2. Reliability analysis of the resulting architecture.
This report describes in detail the design and analysis of the ERV flight computer.
The second section of this volume gives a a brief overview of the ERV avionics design and
discusses key aspects of the Advanced Information Processing System (AIPS) architecture,
upon which the ERV design was based. Section 3 describes, at a functional level, the
buses that link the various parts of the flight computer. It also proposes possible
implementations of the buses and their Interface Units (BIUs) at a physical level. In the
fourth section, several microprocessors are examined, and one is chosen for the central
processing unit in the ERV flight computer. A conceptual packaging design and sizing for
the flight computer are included in Section 5, and Section 6 describes the interfaces
between the avionics devices external to the flight computer and the Input/Output buses
from the flight computer. In Section 7, the method and results of a reliability analysis
which was performed on the ERV avionics are described. The study conclusions are
presented in Section 8.
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2.0 AVIONICS OVERVIEW
The reliability of a system, R(t), is the probability that the system will function
properly and continuously over the time period [0, t]. The complement of a system's
reliability is the probability of the system loss. If R(t) is the reliability of a vehicle, then the
Probability of Vehicle Loss (PvL) is equal to 1-R(t). A PVL of 10 -6 due to the vehicle's
avionics was set as the requirement for the ERV design. Using the AIPS philosophy in the
design process, this number was easily attained. The AIPS fault tolerant processor (FTP)
architecture allows the system to suffer malicious failures while maintaining its integrity.
Redundant hardware masks out faults as they occur in realtime while system software
reconfigures the architecture into operational states. Literature on AIPS [Lala 84] and the
FTP [Smith 84 and Lala et al] is available.
The ERV flight computer consists of three sets (channels) of identical hardware and
is, thus, termed a triplex FTP. All channels run the same processes concurrently,
exchanging and comparing data to assure each has a congruent copy. Each channel is
divided into two Fault Containment Regions (FCRs): a processor and an interstage. An
FCR is a module from which no faults can propagate into or out of. Each FCR must be
electrically and physically isolated from the others and provide its own independent power
and clock mechanisms. Although faults will not propagate from one FCR to another,
e_ors may and must be masked out.
The architecture of the FTP is designed to be resilient to Byzantine failures. A
Byzantine failure is an arbitrarily malicious failure; for instance, one that causes a module to
transmit inconsistent data to differing parts of the system. It has been shown that in order
for a system to toleratef Byzantine failures, it must contain 3f+l FCRs, connect the FCRs
by 2f+l links, and communicate dataf+l rounds through the FCRs [Lamport, Shostak,
Marshall], [Dolev]. In addition, the FCRs must be synchronized to within a well-defined
skew. A triplex FTP is resilient to all first Byzantine failures and thus provides 100%
coverage for all first faults. A triplex FTP also provides 95% coverage for all second
faults.
Figure 2-1 shows a block diagram of the triplex FTP and its six FCRs. The
processors are drawn again on the right to show the interstage-to-processor connections.
The gray lines in the interconnecting network refer to links that are not present for all types
of communications (clock and data topologies differ).
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The links connecting the processors to each other are data communication paths.
These are bidirectional and are used for single source data exchanges. A single source data
exchange is required to assure data congruency among all channels when the data source is
only connected to a single channel.
Processor Interstage Processol
Channel A
Channel B
Channel C
: FCR 5 FCR 6 "
Figure 2.1. FTP Block Diagram
Once all processors have received the source data, the network passes the data from
each processor to their respective interstage and then back to all of the processors. The data
is voted in the hardware at the processor after it has gone through the exchange network.
Error flagging is done in the hardware, relieving the system software from the task.
In addirdon to providing data congruency, the interchannel links provide a topology
for synchronization via a Fault Tolerant Clock (FTC). The FTC synchronizes the channels
to within a well defined bound. Each channel generates its own version of the system FTC
and exchanges it with the other channels for comparison. It then adjusts its own clock as a
result of the comparison, in effect, implementing a digital phase-lock loop. Since each
FCR needs independent clocking, the FTC is voted at both the interstages and the
processors. Hence, each processor broadcasts its FTC to all interstages where the signals
are voted and then passed back to the processors for a second vote.
Section 3 di'scusses the interchannel communication in detail. A variety of FTP-
related papers have been published which describe the architecture [Lala 86], [Lala et al],
[Alger], [Gauthier].
14 Avionics Architecture Studies for the Entry Research Vehicle
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Each "processor" FCR of the FTP will contain two 32-bit microprocessors running
at 25 MHz accompanied by a floating-point coprocessor. 64 Kbytes of RAM and 1 Mbyte
of program ROM will be available to each microprocessing pair. Although the final
implementation has not yet been decided, the likely use of each of the processing pairs is
one for computation-intensive operations and the other for transfers from/to I/O devices. In
addition, each "processor" will contain some shared hardware, including the I/O bus
interfaces and the interchannel communication.
Several microprocessors have been considered for the ERV flight computer
including some MIL-STD-1750A 1 architectures and many 32-bit architectures.
Microprocessor selection is based on a number of factors. These characteristics include
performance, memory and I/O capability, reliability, power dissipation, size, and software
support. Comparing these characteristics with the application's requirements determines
whether the microprocessor will meet the application's needs. The main characteristics
considered in the microprocessor selection for the ERV flight computer were performance,
memory capability, and reliability. After careful comparison of benchmark reports, and the
other characteristics, the Motorola 68020-68881 tandem was chosen as the microprocessor-
coprocessor pair for the ERV flight computer. Although the 68020's performance is
matched by a few other microprocessors, its reliability and support are much better. The
microprocessor selection is discussed more fully in Section 4.
The VI'P I/O network to the rest of the avionics will consist of three MIL-STD-
15532 buses and three custom I/O buses. The custom I/O buses will be connected (one to
each channel of the FTP) and will interface the FTP to the I/O devices that are not 1553
compatible. Each custom I/O bus will be connected to two of the three 1553 buses to
provide a redundant cross-strapped network. The dual cross-strapped architecture provides
tolerance of avionics failures (external to the FTP) without full triple replication of the
hardware.
A block diagram of the VI'P and its I/O buses to the rest of the avionics is shown in
Figure 2-2.
1 The Air Force standard instruction set architecture for microprocessors used in spacecraft flight control.
2 This is the Military Standard Digital Time Division Command/Response Multiplex Data Bus and will
conform to the latest MIL-STD-1553 specification. Currently, this is MIL-STD-1553B.
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3.0 BUS STRUCTURES
The implementation of the FTP for ERV requires the definition of several buses
which link various portions of the computer. This section describes at a functional level the
structures of these buses. It also proposes possible implementations of the buses and their
Interface Units (BIUs) at a physical level. Because the ERV avionics is still at an early
design stage, however, this section does not attempt to provide detailed hardware
characteristics of the buses or their BIUs.
3.1 OVERVIEW OF BUSES IN THE FLIGHT COMPUTER
The ERV FTP will employ four major buses to link modules within its triplex Core
and from the Core to the flight sensors, actuators, and navaids. The buses are the Channel
Bus (CB), the InterChannel Bus (ICB), the Input/Output Bus gOB), and the MIL-STD-
1553 Bus (1553). Figure 3-1 illustrates these buses as components of the flight computer.
Channel A
ICB
CPU 1
(cp)
CPU 2
(lOP)
CB |
FTP Triplex Core
Figure 3.1. ERV Flight Computer
The Channel Bus serves to link the two CPUs in each processor to shared hardware
within that module. Thus, there will be three identical CBs (one per processor) in the FTP.
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The InterChannel Bus is used in the management of the hardware redundancy by
connecting fault-containment regions (processors and interstages).
The Input/Output Bus provides access for each processor to all avionics external to
the flight computer. Each processor will have its own identical IOB.
There will be three MIL-STD-1553 buses in the vehicle. All will be doubly cross-
strapped with access to two processors. This provides tolerance of avionics failures
(external to the Core) without full triple replication of hardware.
In the following sections, each of the buses will be described as to its function and
suggested implementation. Any necessary discussion of its BIU will also be included. A
diagram encapsulating critical information about the bus concludes each section.
An underlying theme to the implementation of all buses is hardware simplicity.
This is especially u'ue when considering (physical) bus sizing. Since a major contributor to
system unreliability is connector failure, all buses have been designed to minimize the
number of physical links in each bus.
3.2 THE CHANNEL BUS
The Channel Bus links the two central processing units (CPUs) in each channel to
the shared hardware in that channel. Since all transactions external to the processor must
use the shared hardware, the CB will be the bus used most frequently in the system.
A CPU is defined as the collection of components which could form a stand-alone
microcomputer. This collection is shown in Figure 3-1 and includes the microprocessor,
its coprocessor, and the volatile and non-volatile memory. The CPUs will for the most part
be identical, but their functions will differ, fit is planned to appoint all I/O transactions to
one CPU, allowing the other to remain computationally intensive.)
The CB will begin at the CPU boundary, as defined by Figure 3-1. Any bus
internal to the CPU will not be included in the CB definition. (This "bus" will be trivial in
comparison to the ones discussed here.)
3.2.1 FUNCTION
The CB will function as most general-purpose microprocessing buses with the
18 Avionics Architecture Studies for the Entry Research Vehicle
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additional constraint of providing FTP-required signals for process synchrony. Thus, it
will serve to Ink the two (master) CPUs to the (slave) shared hardware. It must provide
for a contention or arbitration scheme between the CPUs. It also must allow all operations
on it to be executed in a clock-deterministic manner in order that processors remain
synchronized to within some known and well-bounded skew.
3.2.2 STANDARD Bus FEATURES
As part of the Technical Plan for this Task Assignment, it was suggested that the
Channel Bus could possibly be a standard bus used by other avionics systems. The two
primary military buses (MIL-STD-1553B and PI-bus) were examined as candidates for the
CB. Both were found inappropriate for use based upon two major factors: 1) their
general-purpose natures resulted in an overabundance of hardware complexity; and 2) they
lacked capabilities to easily implement necessary mechanisms for FTP synchrony. In
particular, it would be difficult to design clock-deterministic hardware in spec with those
bus standards. (See Section 3.2.3 below for a discussion of clock-deterministic hardware.)
Since these were the two prime candidates for the CB and did not meet the criteria for
implementation, a non-standard bus specification was developed.
It was also suggested that upward compatibility be a feature of CB so that this
architecture could serve in a larger, more complex avionics system. Since this advisory
does not propose the detailed design for the CB, it also does not limit its potential. The
general specification described here is useful for a wide variety of future applications.
The CB will, however, possess features standard to most microprocessing buses:
slave devices will be selected by either of the CPUs by an address, data will be transferred
on its own dedicated path, and control signals at the Master will govern the transaction.
The following paragraphs describe these features in more detail,
A 12-bit address bus will be provided on the CB. This allows up to 4K slave
devices to be individually selected. While most commercial microprocessing buses provide
for up to 4G individually addressable slave devices, this is far above the required amount
on the CB, which has only 2K of addressable memory. At the same time, 12 address lines
allow for a more flexible memory-mapped scheme to access I/O than do either the 1553 or
PI buses (only 32 slave devices each). Thus the lower bits of the CB address may be
directly driven (or interpreted by the BIU) to the IOB.
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A 16-bit data bus will transfer the data to and from the CPUs on the CB. Since
most I/O will never be greater than 16-bits and the data exchange mechanism will only
transfer 16-bit packets at one time (see Section 3.3.2 ), it is not necessary to make the bus
any wider than 16-bits in width.
Address Stable (AS) and Read-Write (R-W) control lines will be provided by the
master and will take on their conventional meanings.
Notably missing from this bus is a Data Transfer Complete (DTC) signal, which
signifies to the master that the slave has completed its portion of the transaction. This is
discussed in the next section.
Also, thcCB will not have a data sizing signal: all transactions will be word (16-
bits) accessesl Tile shared RAM, and all memory mapped registers (including memory-
mapped I/O) in the shared hardware will thus be word-oriented.
3.2.3 PROCESSOR SYNCHRONY ON THE CB: CLOCK DETERMINISTIC
OPERATION
A major requirement of FTP operation is that all instructions in each replicated
processor follow these guidelines:
• all initial data be identical
• all processors execute the same instruction
• all instructions are synchronized to within some known and bounded
skew
If these three rules are followed then all non-faulty processors will produce the
same result within the skew time.
While other FTP hardware guarantees the adherence to items 1 and 2 above, the CB
must implement a scheme which assures processor synchronization. Processors are
microframe synchronized by the FTP fault-tolerant clocking mechanism, but the CB must
provide lock-step synchronization. That is, the CB must assure each processor executes an
instruction in a predetermined number of CPU clock cycles. This is termed clock
deterministic operation.
Several previous implementations of the FTP use an inherently asynchronous bus
20 Avionics Architecture Studies for the Entry Research Vehicle
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structure for the equivalent of the ERV FTP's CB. In the current implementation, this bus
"synchronizes" its associated processors by enforcing clock deterministic operation of slave
devices. Thus, while the same I/O devices in an asynchronous environment may have
taken 5, 6, or 7 "wait-states" to respond to a transaction, an FTP mechanism will respond
for the device in a predetermined number of wait-states. This mechanism is called a wait-
state generator. The worst-case number, here 7, is taken as the response time to assure
valid data transfer.
The wait-state generator (WSG) is initiated upon the CPU Address Stable (AS)
signal. The WSG then counts a predetermined number of CPU clocks before returning a
DTC to the microprocessor. This number is determined by the specific slave device that is
being accessed (i.e., its address).
The CB will employ a WSG to provide clock-deterministic operation of the FTP
CPUs. One WSG on each CPU will be utilized. They will be preprogrammed (hard-
wired) with the appropriate number of CPU clock counts required for all CB transactions.
The WSG will also be utilized for transactions internal to the CPU to maintain clock
determinism of the hardware. (It should be noted that all instructions internal to the MPU
chips are clock-deterministic.)
3.2.4 CPU CONTENTION FOR THE CB
As with any multiprocessor configuration utilizing shared resources, the CB must
have a well-defined bus contention scheme to arbitrate requests between the CPUs for bus
mastership. Similar to the clock-deterministic requirements for data transfer, the
implementation of CB arbitration must assure processor synchrony.
There are several methods which could be used to arbitrate between CPUs while
still providing for processor synchrony. A simple method is to base arbiter decisions on
the fault-tolerant clock (FTC) - a system'wide, synchronized signal which oscillates at a
frequency lower than the CPU clock (1 MHz v. 25 MHz, see Section 3.3.1). With two
CPUs per channel, each phase of the FTC can be used to coordinate bus mastership on the
CB: when the clock is high, one CPU is allowed CB access; when FTC is low, the other
CPU can take mastership. More complex schemes can be implemented using the basic
premise that the FTC is a longer period (than the CPU clock), synchronized, system-wide
clock.
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For purposes of this study, it shall be assumed that the CPU contention on the CB
is arbitrated using the simple technique of FTC phase state. For the final ERV
implementation, this may not be feasible, since the CPU may require use of the bus for
time lengths greater than the FTC period. More complex schemes may use a multiple of the
FTC for arbitration, a weighted scheme which gives preference to the one CPU (the IOP),
or less stringent requirements on time for taking bus mastership (perhaps end of FTC
phases would be legitimate if the CB is free). Nevertheless, the scheme must assure
processor synchrony, and the FTC is an obvious means of reaching that end.
The arbiter should reside in the shared hardware. Four signals will be used to
facilitate arbitration: two request lines and two acknowledge lines, one per CPU. While a
simpler means could probably be instituted (using only the FTC signal and allowing CPUs
to resolve contention themselves?), four signals allow for flexibility in this stage of the
design.
3.2.5 CPU CLOCKING ON THE C B
A final requirement of the CB is to provide a common clock to each CPU, termed
appropriately, CPUCLK. The CPUCLK will be the high-frequency system clock which
controls the operation of the CPUs, including especially, the microprocessing units
(MPUs). Each CPU can be thought of as a state-machine, where next states are determined
solely by present state conditions. The CPUs ate clocked at regular intervals to execute all
operations.
The CPUCLK will be controlled by the FTC mechanism. The FTC is a divided-
down version of the CPUCLK. A sequencer in the FTC synchronizes processors by
regulating the CPUCLKs in order to digitally phase-lock the common FTC signal. This is
done by "deleting" or "delaying" pulses in the CPUCLK stream to assure that the same
number of CPUCLK edges are received by all processors during one FTC period. This
process is described further in Section 3.3.1. Thus the CPUCLK will be a high-frequency
regulated pulse train, as shown in Figure 3-2.
Figure 3-2. Pulse Train of CPUCLK
22 Avionics Architecture Studies for the Entry Research Vehicle
Ii! I i
BUS STRUCTURES
3.2.6 BIU FOR THE CHANNEL B US
Bus Interface Units (BIUs) must be provided from the CPUs to the CB.
Minimally, each BIU must properly drive, terminate, and receive the CB signals. The BIU
must also perform some low-level tasks, such as bus contention decoding. The extent of
the complexity of the BIUs rests with the f'mal avionics design.
3.2.7 CHANNEL BUS IMPLEMENTATION SUMMARY
Figure 3-3 depicts the CB implementation suggested in this section. It shows that
there axe a total of 34 signals on the bus: 16 data, 12 address, AS, R-W, and 2 each of Bus
Requests and Bus Grants. (Note that each CPU only transmits one request and receives
only one grant.)
CPU
BIUI
CPU 2
Bus Grants
CPUCLK
Bus Requests
Shared Hardware I
Figure 3-3 Channel Bus Signals
3.3 THE INTERCHANNEL BUS
The InterChannel Bus (ICB) serves to connect all fault containment regions (FCRs)
in the ERV flight computer. As in all _ architectures, each channel contains two FCRs:
a processor and an interstage. The mechanism in each processor which interacts with other
processors and interstages is termed a communicator. The interstage's sole function, on
the other hand, is to interact with processors.
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The ERV FTP channels must communicate data and clock information in order to
maintain a fault-tolerant system. The two pieces of information are treated separately in the
ERV FTP to avoid providing an overabundance of hardware and interconnections. That is,
the data and clock exchange mechanisms have two separate topologies.
3.3.1 CLOCK EXCHANGE MECHANISM
The ERV flight computer redundant channels will be tightly synchronized at the
instruction level. This FTP technique bounds the skew between processors - one of the
requirements of FTP operation. Discrete processor clocks are synchronized indirectly by
using a lower frequency, system-wide fault-tolerant clock (FTC). Processor clocks are
synchronized using a digital phase-lock loop technique which allows each processor to
"adjust" its own clock based upon its position relative to the FTC.
The FTC period is generally an order of magnitude longer than processor clocks.
The exact relationship is application-specific and depends upon the data exchange rate
required by the system. For example, a 200 KHz FTC synchronizes the 8 MHz processor
clocks in the AIRLAB FTP [Gauthier].
The method of processor clock synchronization is illustrated by Figure 3-4 and can
be briefly described as follows: Each processor creates a version of the FTC by dividing
its processor clock (CPUCLK) by a predetermined factor. (For the AIRLAB VI'P, the
factor is 40:[8 MHz] + 40 = [200 KHz].) FTCs are broadcasted from processors and
voted at each interstage. A "voted" copy of the clock is then transmitted by each interstage
to all processors. At the processors, a voted copy of the clock is again created. The
resultant signal is compared to the FTC created by the processor (CPUCLK divided
down). A processor then regulates its FTC (and CPUCLK) based upon the results of the
comparison. This implementation is the classic method designed by Smith and McKenna.
In the figure, all hardware in the processor - except for the CPUs - is located in the
shared hardware and is collectively termed the FTC Communicator. The very brief
description given in this section can be supplemented by Smith's [Smith 81] work on fault-"
tolerant clocking schemes.
The configuration of the interconnection for the FTC will be the same as
implemented in the NASA/Langley AIRLAB FTP. This fully connected network is
illustrated in Figure 3-5.
24 Avionics Architecture Studies for the Entry Research Vehicle
i_I i:
BUS STRUCTURES
oscillator
CPU 1
CPU 2
From Interstages PhaseComparator [
.Voted FTC I
Processor
From Procesoom
,4 FTC _._ To Processors
Figure 3-4. Digital Phase-Lock Loop Implementation of the Fault-Tolerant Clock
FTC Communicator
A !___ i_,_ /_,_ ...i Channel
processor interstage processor
Figure 3-5. ERV FTP Fault-Tolerant Clock Network Topology
3.3.1.1 FAULT-TOLERANT CLOCK SPEED
The frequency of the FTC depends upon the required data exchange rate for the
application. In order to distribute a congruent copy of data to all non-faulty processors (an
FTP requirement), the processors must be synchronized within some known skew. Since
all (non-faulty) processor clocks are bounded within some skew of the FTC, this signal is
used to synchronize data exchanges.
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All input to and output from the FTP must be exchanged between channels. In the
ERV, an extremely high I/O rate will be demanded of the flight computer. Thus, the data
exchange rate - i.e., the FTC frequency - should be as high as feasibly possible.
It has been determined that the FTC period will be 1 gs. This 1 MHz frequency
will adequately support gO rates required by the vehicle. In addition, it can provide phase-
locking of CPUCLKs on the order of 20-30 MHz without a large percentage skew. It
appears that the processor CPUs will be running at frequencies in this range (see Section
4.0.)
3.3.1.2 FTC MASKING AND SYNDROME INFORMATION
One requirement for the clocking mechanism in the FTP is the provision for mask
and syndrome information at both clock voters (processor and interstage). This allows the
hardware to isolate and detect clock failures. It-als-0 allows the b'TlrrFault Detection,
Isolation, and Reconfiguration (FDIR) software to reconfigure the hardware in order to
permanently mask failed elements in the system. Thus, the mask and syndrome
information must be available to the CPUs.
At the processor voter, providing such hardware does not present a problem to the
design. Readable and writable registers can be provided at the FTC Communicator. These
registers are easily mapped as part of the shared hardware. The CPU performing FDIR can
access them at will.
The process is not as simple for the interstage mask and syndrome registers. In
order to assure resilience to Byzantine failures, clock masks at the interstage cannot be
received from a single processor. Should that processor be faulty, it could pass an
incorrect mask to the interstage voter, causing the interstage to have a value dissimilar to the
other interstages' values which, in turn, causes that interstage's voter to behave incorrectly.
Thus, a failure in one fault-containment region could propagate to another region - an
unacceptable consequence for fault-tolerant systems.
One method to assure congruent masks is to provide a voter for them. All
processors, then, should broadcast the three mask values (ENABLE_A, ENABLE_B,
ENABLE_C) to all interstages. Prior to voting the clock values, the clock masks must be
voted.
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Syndrome (suspected error) information need not be as complicated. Each
interstage voter can broadcast its syndrome (on command) to only its own processor
without endangering system integrity. However, this data must be exchanged between all
channels using the data communication network before it is analyzed.
The resulting required FTC mask and syndrome configuration can thus be"
described by Figures 3-6 (Topology), Figure 3-7 (Interstage Hardware), and Figure 3-8
(FTC Communicator Hardware).
FTC Communicator
Interstage
FTC Communicator
A
B
C
3 clock masks 3 clock syndromes
Figure 3-6. FTC Mask and Syndrome Topology
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Figure 3-7. FTC Masks and Syndromes at lnterstage
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Figure 3-8. FTC Masks and Syndromes at FTC Communicator
3.3.2 DATA EXCHANGE MECHANISM
The ERV FTP data exchange hardware must assure that a congruent copy of all data
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is received by all non-faulty processors. Typical purposes of data exchanges include
proliferation of single source input data (data available only to one channel), check of
critical data (especially output data), fault detection, isolation, and reconfiguration (FDIR)
software routines, and software synchronization of processors.
While the ERV processing core may operate on many floating-point numbers, there
does not seem to be a great need to exchange such large values. This is because the major
type of data traffic through the exchanger will be I/O data, which will primarily be no
greater than 16-bit values. Although some complex navaids, including the LINS and MLS,
may require 32-bit I/O fields, the frequency of these data rates are small in comparison to
those with 16-bits in length. Based upon this rationalization and in order to keep the data
exchanger as simplistic as possible, the ERV FTP data exchange mechanism will pass only
16-bit words.
A major constraint in the ERV design is the packaging of the flight computer. As
mentioned in the introduction to this section, one important criteria to be evaluated during
this design phase is the amount of interconnections between hardware modules.
Specifically, the concern here is the physical size of the ICB. Different versions of the
CSDL FTP data exchanger which vary the ICB data bus width have been implemented.
Papadopoulos integrated a serial bit stream exchange mechanism for the Iron Bird
simulation of the F-8 Digital Fly-By-Wire program at NASA's Dryden Research Center
[Hopkins, Lala, Smith]. As a research and development effort, this implementation also
allowed a variety of experimental tasks to be performed at the interstages. For the NASA
Langley Research Center's AIRLAB FTP, McKenna and Hughes redesigned the data
exchanger to implement byte parallel data widths [Gauthier]. In addition, this latest method
simplified the interchannel communication by reducing the functionality at the interstages,
thereby reducing the unit's complexity. A description of the differences between the two
configurations has been presented elsewhere [Lala 85], [Lala 86].
The ERV FTP data communication scheme will employ the simplistic elements of
both designs mentioned above: a serial data stream with reduced interstage complexity.
The topology is shown in Figure 3-9. In this illustration, all data paths are serial and
accompanied by a high-speed clock. Since the rate of word exchanges will be governed by
the FTC speed, the bit rate must be at least 16 times the frequency of the FTC. This will
insure that the word to be exchanged can be transferred through the communication
network within one FTC period. With a 1 MHz FTC rate, then, a serial data stream must
be driven at minimally 16 MHz. To allow for hardware overhead delay times, this rate will
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be 25 MHz. That is, the data exchange mechanism for the ERV FTP will drive a serial bit
stream at 25 MHz.
A
B
C
Data
m
processor interstage processor
Figure 3-9. Data Exchange Topology
3.3.2.1 HARDWARE IMPLEMENTATION AND VOTING
The data exchange hardware can be divided into 3 sections which follow the flow
of data from source to final destination: communicator-to-communicator, communicator-
to-interstage, interstage-to-communicator. These sections are described below.
3.3.2.1.1 Communicator-to-Communicator Hardware
For single source exchanges (the most frequent type of data exchange), the source
processor transmits its data to the other processors. This precedes the broadcast of data to
the interstages. A block diagram of the hardware is seen in Figure 3-10.
As seen from the figure' data is sourced from one communicator to the others
through serial bit streams. Both communicators are able to execute the same type of
exchange as long as the Source Data Register has a unique memory location, since the
controllers can decode the Channel Bus address and recognize the operation. The FTC is
used to synchronize the execution.
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Controller
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FTC
Channel Bus
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Figure 3-10. Communicator-to-Communicator Hardware
It is important to note that each communicator uses independent clocks for data
broadcast. This insures they follow the requirements of a fault-containment region.
3.3.2.1.2 Communicator-to-Interstage Hardware
Once the non-source communicators (simultaneously) receive the data to be
exchanged, all three communicators transmit the data to their own interstages. This is a
simple task and is outlined in Figure 3-1 I.
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Figure 3-11. Communicator-to-Interstage Hardware
Notice that,as inthe Hughes implementation of thedataexchange hardware forthe
AIRLAB FTP, thereisno voting of data atthe interstage.This isbecause the intcrstage
need only bc a repeaterof the data. While voting at the interstagedoes provide further
information for the FDIR regiment,itdoes not provide a guaranteed increasein system
reliability(itdoes not allow for 100% coverage of the second failure,forinstance).Italso
servestomake the intcrstagchardware more complex (and thusmore likelytofail)and is
thereforenot includedintheERV FTP.
The Fault-Tolerant Clocks are voted (Section 3.3.1) at the interstage, however,
because the clocking at each FCR must be independent from the clocking of the others.
The FTC is used as the clocking mechanism at the interstage and at the same time
synchronizes each interstage to the remainder of the system. Since clocking at each FCR
must be independent, the FTC cannot originate from a single source. Voting must be
employed to make the signal independent from the other FCRs.
"3.3.2.1.3 Interstage-to-Communicator Hardware
The final leg of all data exchanges is the interstage-to-communicator transmission.
Each interstage broadcasts its data and 25 MHz clock to all communicators. Once the data
is stable (all 16-bits) at the communicator, a vote is taken. The resultant copy is then placed
in a register accessible from the Channel Bus. As with the clock voters, masks and
syndrome bits are provided for the FDIR routines. The hardware for the data
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communicator receiver with voter is diagrammed in Figure 3-12.
At 40 ns per bit (25 MHz), hardware overhead per data exchange cycle is 360 ns.
This includes transmission time and all hardware (including the voter) delay times. This
seems to be plentiful for the compact implementation of the FTP in the ERV.
I-
--A data _ SlPO Register
-,{--A 25MHz
--B data _I
--B 25MHz
--C data
--C 25MHz
Controller
_ l Mask for
_ Data Voter
I
• Channel Bus
SiPO Register
SIPO Register FTI_c
Data Voter
Syndrome from
Data Voter
I
Data Result Register
3
.I
Figure 3.12. Hardware for Communicator Receiver with Voter
3.3.3 ICB BUS INTERFACE UNITS AND TRANSMISSION LINE
CHARACTERISTICS
The BIUs from the ICB include all hardware described in the previous sections.
The BIUs must also include the line drivers and receivers for the data transmission and
reception. The 40 ns per bit rate is not unrealistic using standard |ransistor-transistor logic
(TTL) technology gates, but other sources for data communication should be examined in
the final design.
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All interconnection will be unidirectional, except for the data communicator-to-
communicator links, which will be bidirectional. A final analysis during the detailed design
phase should consider whether or not the links need to be differentially driven. This would
be necessary if the FCRs are located a large distance (> 2 feet) from one another or if the
environment of the ICB will be particularly noisy (including noise induced by the FTP
itself).
....... 3. 3. 4_S_UMMARY OF._THE _ICB IMPLEMENTATION
The ICB will consist of two separate topologies: a clock exchange mechanism and a
data exchange mechanism. The interconnection, and implementation of the hardware for
both can be functionally separated, although the data exchanger relies heavily on the fault-
tolerant clock exchanger for synchronizing the inter-channel communication. The figures
of the ICB topology (Figures 3-5, 3-6, and 3-9) describe the ICB interconnection fully.
3.4 INPUT/OUTPUT NETWORK
To provide the centralized ERV flight computer with access to the variety of input
and output (I/O) located throughout the vehicle, there will be a distributed I/O network
consisting of three MIL-STD-1553 buses, each doubly cross-strapped to three VFP I/O
buses (IOBs). This section describes the simple functionality and protocol of the IOB, its
BIU to the FTP channel, and the IOB-1553 BIU.
3.4.1 THE IOB
The IOB will provide a link between each channel's shared hardware to several
custom I/O devices and the three MIL-STD-1553 buses that are distributed throughout the
spacecraft. The configuration is depicted in Figure 3-13, a block diagram of the ERV flight
computer.
3.4.1.1 FOINTERLOCK
An IOB BIU will interface the IOB to the channel's shared hardware. This BIU
will have the capability to shut down the IOB to prevent a failed processor from babbling
on it. This type of operation is called Output Interlock. This section briefly describes this
function and a possible implementation of it.
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I/0 and MIL-STD-1553 Buses in ERV Flight Computer
Should a channel fail in such a way as to babble on its IOB, severe consequences
could result. Output could be actuated in a manner detrimental to vehicle health. The FTP
must be able to shut down this failed channel's output to the IOB. This is accomplished
using the Output Interlock. The Interlock receives an OUTPUT-ENABLE signal from
each of the channels. A two-of-three voter at the BIU determines whether or not to allow a
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channel to drive the lOB signals. This means, however, that additional interconnections
must link the processors.
A total of four unidirectional links will connect all processors, two originating from
and two incoming to each channel. Note that these need not undergo a source congruency
exchange, since all non-faulty processors will transmit a congruent ENABLE signal for the
specified channel. Figure 3-14 illustrates the interconnections of the Interlock.
Processor
Processor
Channel B
CB
lOB Output Interlock
Figure 3-14.
BIU Voter
FTP Output Interlock
3.4.1.2 IMPLEMENTATION OF IOB
The following characterize the lOB:
• All devices - including the 1553 BIUs - will be memory-mapped.
Intelligent control from memory-mapped registers will be utilized when
necessary.
• There will be 1 Kwords of address space (10 address lines).
• There will be a 16-bit wide (word) data bus.
• All transactions will be word-oriented.
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• There will be Address Stable and Read-Write signals, taking on their
conventional meanings.
• There will be no Data Transfer Complete (DTC) signal.
• The IOB BIU will be the sole bus master.
• There will be no clock on the bus.
From the above items, one can see that the IOB will be extremely similar to the
Channel Bus with reduced functionality.
3.4.2 1553 BIUS
Each of the three MIL-STD-1553 buses will each be attached tO two IOBs through a
1553-BIU, as seen Figure 3-13. These BIUs serve as the 1553 masters for all
transactions. Since only one of the BIUs can be a 1553 master at a time, the dynamic
mastership capabilities of the 1553 will be utilized.
Under normal operation, each channel will control exactly one 1553-BIU and thus
indirectly serve as that bus' master. Upon failure of a channel, the mastership of its 1553
will be dynamically reconfigured to another channel. For instance, should Channel A fail,
Channel C could become master of 1553 #1. This assures that all I/O devices can be
accessed from a duplex FTP configuration.
The devices on the 1553 buses will be of two types: "off-the-shelf" standard 1553
slaves found commonly in most aerospace applications and ERV-custom slaves. The latter
type will conform fully to MIL-STD-1553 specification, but will be designed expressly for
the ERV application. These devices will employ a standard interface unit described in
Section 5.2.2. They consist of:
• 1553 line driver and receiver
• 1553 "address" decoder
• ADC or DAC module with data latches
• Interface to the sensor/actuator
The 1553 bus is inherently dual-redundant. This feature will be included in the
ERV implementation.
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3.4.3 SUMMARY OF THE IOB IMPLEMENTATION
To summarize, the IOB will be fashioned much like the CB with a reduced address
range. Also excluded from the IOB definition will be bus arbitration and clocking. An
Output Interlock will assure the shutdown of the output from all failed processors. This
Interlock will be part of the IOB BIU. The three MIL-STD-1553 buses will be cross-
swapped to the IOB through specialized BIUs as well.
t ..............
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4.0 MICROPROCESSOR SELECTION
This section describes the microprocessor selection process, examines the qualities
of some of the most up-to-date microprocessors, and selects one for the ERV flight
computer CPU.
Microprocessor selection for a specific application is based on a number of factors.
These factors include characteristics such as performance, memory and I/O capability,
reliability, power dissipation, size, and software support. Comparing these micro-
processor features with the application's requirements determines whether the micro-
processor will meet the application's needs. The main characteristics considered in the
microprocessor selection for the ERV flight computer were performance, memory
capability, and reliability.
4. I MICROPROCESSOR PERFORMANCE
Microprocessor performance is measured in instructions per second and is
calculated by measuring the time it takes the microprocessor to process a particular
program. The ideal way to measure a microprocessor's performance for a specific
application would be to run the application program on the microprocessor. This,
obviously, is impossible to do in the preliminary design stages of a computer system. As
an ahemative, vendors of microprocessors provide performance benchmarks for their
products. Benchmark programs resemble typical scientific programs that are run and timed
on the microprocessors to give the performance benchmarks.
At first glance, performance benchmarks can be very deceiving. Many times
vendors claim to have a microprocessor with a very high performance level but don't
specify the benchmark that was used to obtain the performance value. Comparing
processors' performance levels without knowing from which benchmark program they
were obtained can be misleading. For instance, some benchmarks use only floating-point
calculations while others use only integer calculations. Comparing a floating-point
benchmark to an integer benchmark is comparing apples to oranges. Also, because most of
the standard benchmarking programs are written in high level languages they measure
compiler and operating system efficiency as well as pure microprocessor performance.
When a vendor compares its processor's performance directly with another processor, it
must be made clear what type of systems the processors are running on and what types of
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compilers are implemented, otherwise the comparison is meaningless. It is assumed that
when a vendor quotes a standard performance benchmark for its own microprocessor, a
compiler of maximum efficiency was used, thus enhancing the processor's performance
level to obtain the benchmark.
The Whetstone benchmark is used to measui'e floating-point performance. It was
originally written in ALGOL but is now almost always run in FORTRAN. The program
includes procedure calls, array indexing, and transcendental operations, as well as floating-
point operations. One pass through the program executes one million Whetstone
instructions. Because it is written in a high level language, the Whetstone benchmark
measures compiler efficiency as well as processor performance. The benchmark can,
however, be compared quite easily over different systems because of the single language
(FORTRAN) implementation.
The Dhrystone benchmark, like the Whetstone, represents a typical scientific
program, but it does not implement any floating-point calculations. It makes no calls to the
operating system so it can be accurately compared over different systems. The Dhrystone
benchmark is written in Ada® with C and Pascal translations, and is a good measure of
compiler maturity and processor performance.
The Linpack benchmark program has a high percentage of floating-point
operations. It is written in FORTRAN and comes in two versions, single and double
precision floating-point operations. The Linpack benchmark measures floating-point
processor performance and compiler efficiency.
The Digital Avionics Instruction Set (DAIS) mix has been adopted by the Air Force
to measure the performance of 1750A microprocessors. The DAIS mix is different than the
other benchmarks described above in that it is not a program that can be run on a processor.
It is a list of instructions that are found in typical scientific programs. The performance
value for a microprocessor using the DAIS mix is obtained by summing the process times
for the instructions in the mix and is given in instructions per second.
Because of the floating-point requirements of the navigational and guidance
algorithms to be processed by the ERV flight computer, the Whetstone benchmark is best
suited for performance measurements of CPU candidates. The DAIS mix, because of its
@Ada is a registered trademark of the U.S. Government (Ada Joint Program Office).
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floating-point considerations, is used in comparing the 1750A microprocessors.
4.2 THE 1750A INSTRUCTION SET ARCHFFECTLrRE
The Air Force has adopted a standard hardware Instruction Set Architecture CISA),
MIL-STD-1750A, for microprocessors used in spacecraft flight control. This was done to
standardize the software support for microprocessors, thus creating competition among
vendors to reduce costs of development systems. Without a standard ISA, each
microprocessor has its own software support tools making the cost of microprocessor-
based systems high. Another advantage to having a standard ISA is that mature software
assemblers and compilers are available off the shelf. Compilers for microprocessors
without standard ISAs are usually less efficient because of their immaturity.
A big disadvantage in setting a standard ISA is that soon after it is set, it tends to be
out of date from rapidly moving technology. The main disadvantage of the 1750A ISA is
that it is only a 16-bit architecture. Most of today's 32-bit microprocessors can out perform
any 1750A microprocessor. Without a Memory Management Unit, 1750A micro-
processors can only access 16K bytes of RAM or I/O space where a 32-bit address space
covers 4G bytes.
4.3 1V[ICROPROCES SOR STATISTICS
Figure 4-1, on the following page, lists the microprocessors considered for the
ERV flight computer along with some of their pertinent characteristics:
4.4 MICROPROCESSOR SELECTION
A comparison of all the microprocessors resulted in selecting the Motorola
68020/68881 combination for the ERV flight computer. The following paragraphs
describe the most qualified microprocessors in greater detail and then a rationale for the
selection of the 68020/68881 pair is given.
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Microprocessor Architecture Technology ThroughputMemory CapabilityPower,
Size
Motorola 32-bit CMOS 1.24 MWhets 4 Gbytcs 1.75 W/chip
68020/68881 Double-precision 2 chips, PGA
Fairchild 32-bit CMOS 2.0 MWhets 4 Gbytes 6 W, 3 chips
CLIPPER TM Double-precision 3 x 4.5" PC board
AT&T 32-bit CMOS 2.5 MWhets 4 Gbytes 2 W/chip
WE®32200 Single-precision 3 chips, PGA
Intel 32-bit CHMOS RI 1.8 MWhets 4 Gbytes 2.25 W/chip
80386/80387 Single-precision 2 chips
Nat Semi. 32-bit NMOS .130 MFlops 4 Gbytes 2.0 W/chip
NS32332 Linpack Benchmark 2 chips
Performance 1750A CMOS 1.7 MWhets 1 MWonls 2.5 W
Semiconductor Single-precision w/MMU 2 chips
PACE1750A 2.6 MIPS DAIS
McDonnell 1750A CMOS 0.4 MWhets 1 MWords 2 W/chip
Douglas MDC281 Single-precision w/MMU 3 chips
Fairchild 9450 1750A Bipolar 0.7 MIPS DAIS 1 MWords w/M/dU 3 Watts
Texas Instruments 1750A VHSIC Bipolar 2 MIPS DAIS 1 MWords 2.3 Watts
VHSIC DPU One chip
Delco Magic 5 1750A CMOS 1 MIPS DAIS 1 MWords w/MMU 2.2 watts
Figure 4.1. Comparison of Microprocessor Characteristics
4.4.1 1750A ISA
The overall statistics shows that the 1750A microprocessors cannot perform on the
same level as the 32-bit architectures. Only one, the PACE1750A, is in the range of the
32-bit microprocessors with 1.7 MWhets (single precision) at 40 MHz. The PACE1750A
cannot, however, perform double-precision floating-point calculations which will be
required in the processing of ERV navigational algorithms.
4.4.2 FAIRCHILD CLIPPER
The CLIPPER TM is a three chip set mounted on 3.0 x 4.5 inch printed circuited
board with a 96-pin connector attaching it to the rest of the system. The chip set includes a
CPU/FPU chip, an instruction cache-MMU chip, and a data cache-MMU chip. The
inexpedience of physically separating the CPU from the rest of the system in an avionics
flight computer is the primary reason for not selecting the CLIPPER for the ERV computer.
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It is also a relatively new product and Fairchild has no intention of producing a military
specification version of the CLIPPER in the immediate future.
4.4.3 AT&T WE 32200
The AT&T 32-bit three chip family consists of the CPU (WE ® 32200), a Memory
Management Unit (WE 32201), and a Math Accelerator Unit (WE 32206). This group can
perform 2.5 single-precision MWhets, but no double-precision benchmarks were available.
On a rough scale, the WE 32200 performs 2.5 single-precision MWhets. With no
overwhelming performance benchmarks, three chips to its set compared to Motorola's two,
and no military specification version in the near future, the WE 32200 microprocessor was
not chosen as the CPU for the ERV flight computer.
4.4.4 INTEL 80386
Intel claims a Whetstone benchmark for its 80386/80387 combination by C version
of the Whetstone benchmark program which has never been verified to be comparable to
the standard FORTRAN or ALGOL versions. The C program requires single-precision
rather than double-precision floating point calculations. With this in mind, the
80386/80387's performance does not compare with the Motorola 68020/68881.
4.4.5 NATIONAL SEMICONDUCTOR NS32332
The NS32332/32081 combination performs as well as the Motorola 68020/68881
under the Linpack benchmark, according to National Semiconductor. However, the
military version of their 32-bit processor, the NS32C032 performs only one third as well
as the NS32332. No information on the Whetstone benchmark was available for the
NS32332.
4.4.6 MOTOROLA 68020
The 68000 series is a proven product by Motorola. The 68020 combines a pipe-
lined architecture with on-chip cache memory to enhance its performance. The 68881
floating-point coprocessor conforms to the IEEE P754 standard. It contains eight general
purpose floating-point data registers, each supporting a full 80-bit extended precision data
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format. With softwaresupport in many high level languages including C and Ada, and a
military specification version in the planning, the 68020/68881 combination is the favorable
choice for the ERV flight computer CPU.
On strictly a performance scale, the top microprocessors axe quite close. Other
factors, however, separate the MC 68020/68881 from the rest. These factors include
development risks with new products such as the CLIPPER and the WE 32200 series,
reliability measures (military specification parts have a much higher reliability than
commercial parts), and lack of existing software support. The MC 68020/68881 is the best
candidate for the ERV flight computer microprocessor.
4.4.7 TRADEMARKS
• CLIPPER TM is a trademark of the Fairchild Camera and Instrument
Corporation.
• WE® is a registered trademark of AT&T.
• PACE Technology is a trademark of the Performance Semiconductor
Corporation.
Any use of trademarks in this document which have not been specifically
recognized is purely unintentional.
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5.0 FTP INPUT/OUTPUT
The FTP Input/Output (I/O) network will consist of three 1553 buses and three
custom I/O buses. The custom I/O buses will be connected one to each channel of the FTP
and will interface the FTP to the I/O devices that are not 1553 compatible. Each custom I/O
bus will be connected to two of the 1553 buses to provide a redundant cross-strapped
network. The dual cross-strapped architecture provides tolerance of avionics failures
(external to the FTP) without full triple replication of the hardware. A block diagram of the
FTP and its I/O buses to the rest of the avionics is shown in Figure 5-1.
5.1 CUSTOM I/O BUS
Each channel of the FTP will have a custom I/O Bus (lOB) which will interface the
FTP to the avionics that are not 1553 compatible. These avionics include the skids, the air
data, the Ground Support Electronics (GSE), and the Radar Altimeter. There will be some
electronics to interface each I/O device it to the IOB.
5.1.1 Am DATA
There will be fourteen orifices in the nose cap of the ERV each containing three
pressure transducers to collect air data. This provides a triply redundant interface for the air
data. Each transducer will send three wires back to the FTP (126 total) where the signals
will be converted to digital levels before being transmitted on the IOB.
5.1.2 RADAR ALTIMETER
The Radar Altimeter will be located in the avionics bay and will have an antenna
attached to the aft skid. It will have a dual redundant link to the FTP through a serial digital
interface. The Radar Altimeter will give a 32-bit input to the FI'P at each reading.
5.1.3 GROUND SUPPORT ELECTRONICS (GSE)
There will be two GSEs each with a single 1553 interface to the FTP. GSE #1 will
be connected to Channel B and GSE #2 will be connected to Channel C as shown in Figure
5-1.
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Figure 5-1. ERV Avionics Block Diagram
5.1.4 SKIDS
Both the forward and aft skids will be linked to all channels of the FTP through the
IOB. The criticality of the skids requires this triply redundant interface. The interface itself
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will be a simple A/D convener for the sensors and a D/A converter with forced voting for
the actuators.
5.2 MIL-STD-1553 BUS
The MIL-STD-1553 bus (Military Standard Digital Time Division Command-
Response Multiplex Data Bus) was designed to efficiently integrate avionics subsystems.
The current version, the MIL-STD-1553B, is implemented widely in military applications
and allows flexible, lightweight, and easily tested and modified integration of electronic
subsystems.
The 1553B is a serial data bus with dual redundancy to eliminate single point
failures. The physical bus is a shielded twisted pair cable. Traffic on the bus travels in one
direction at a time over one of the redundant cables. All subsystems have access to all
transmissions and are connected to the data bus via terminals. The terminals are
transformer-coupled to the bus for signal common mode rejection and are isolated by
resistors for fault protection. As many as 31 terminals can be attached to a 1553B data bus,
and each terminal can service up to 30 subsystems.
There are three types of interfaces (terminals) on each bus: a bus controller, a bus
monitor, and a remote terminal unit. The bus controller initiates bus message transfers on
the data bus. Bus monitors receive bus traffic and extract selected information to be used at
a later time. A terminal not operating as a bus controller or bus monitor is a remote terminal
unit. Typically, bus control is centralized. There is, however, a mode called dynamic bus
control which allows distributed control of the bus by passing it from one terminal to
another.
The 1553B network functions in a command/response sequence. Bus
transmissions are serial time division multiplex messages in pulse code modulation form.
They are coded in Manchester II biphase level form which is self-clocking with a
zerocrossing during each bit time. Because it is not level sensitive, Manchester coding is
ideal for the transformer coupling requirement of 1553B.
1553B bus transmissions are word-oriented. Each word consists of a 3-bit "sync"
(which determines the format of the word), 16 bits of data, and a parity bit to detect errors.
There are three types of word formats: command words, data words, and status words.
Command words come before a message and describe the format of the subsequent
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message. They can only be sent by the bus controller. Data words are then sent with the
most significant bit first (immediately following the 3-bit "sync"). Status words are
transmitted during each message except during a broadcast message. They indicate the
remote terminal status and any errors detected in the message.
Each type of terminal provides an interface between a subsystem and the serial data
bus. It performs four basic functions: 1) It transmits and receives the analog signals to and
from the data bus, 2) it encodes/decodes the Manchester coded signal, 3) it has protocol
circuits to manage the data bus transfers, and 4) it contains the subsystem interface.
Because the MIL-STD-1553B is a mature standard that has been utilized on various
military programs, numerous suppliers have introduced components that can be used as
terminals. Power requirements and circuit complexities have created a need for multiple
chip 1553B terminals. However, these designs are often packaged in a single hybrid
circuit to meet the small size requirements of airborne military equipment.
Figure 5-1 shows three types of interfaces to the 1553 buses: The Bus Interface
Units, "off the shelf' 1553 interfaces (drawn in boxes), and custom 1553 interfaces (drawn
in ovals). The "off the shelf" interfaces refer to avionics in which the 1553 bus connects
directly without any outside interfacing. These avionics include the Microwave Landing
System (MLS), the Laser Inertial Navigational System (LINS), the Global Positional
System (GPS), the star tracker, and the telemetry. The other types of interfaces are
described in the following sections.
5.2.1 BUS INTERFACE UNIT (BIU)
The BIUs will contain the 1553 bus controller chips and will be the only masters of
the 1553 buses. Each channel of the FTP is connected to two of the 1553 buses and, under
normal operation, each channel will have control over one them. If, however, one of the
channels fails, the control of its 1553 bus will be passed to the other channel connected to
it.
5.2.2 CUSTOM 1553 INTERFACES
Although the interfaces differ in their sizes and speeds, the basic custom 1553
interface to be used in the ERV is shown in Figure 5-2.
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Figure 5-2. 1553 Interface
5.2.2.1 AERODYNAMIC CONTROL SURFACE
The aerodynamic control surfaces on the ERV consist of two tip fins, two elevons,
and a body flap. There are seven controllers/sensors connected to these five surfaces (one
additional for each tip f'm). The interface to each surface will be triply redundant with three
sensors and one or more controllers. Signals from all three channels will be force voted
and then sent to the controller while each sensor will be read by one channel of the FTP.
5.2.2.2 MAIN_GINES
There are three main engines and each will have a triplex interface to the FTP. Each
engine will have eight actuators: two safety regulators, two throttle valves, two solenoids,
a yaw actuator, and a pitch actuator. The sensors in the main engines axe not yet defined.
5.2.2.3 REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM (RCS) JETS
The RCS jets are divided into forward and aft modules. The forward jets will have
a duplex interface to the FTP, and the aft jets will have a triplex interface. Each jet has two
transducers and a thermocouple.
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5.3 I/O SUMMARY
Other I/O devices not mentioned in the previous sections, such as the experiment
and the experiment telemetry, have not yet been def'med to the point where an I/O interface
can be designed.
The criticality of each I/O device is discussed in Section 7.0 (Reliability Analysis).
Also presented there is the rationale for the redundancy of their interfaces to the FTP.
To summarize the I/O architecture, a schematic of the central computer with its
attached distributed I/O is depicted in Figure 5-3. The schematic illustrates the layout of the
electronics in the vehicle. For context, Figure 5-4 shows the various bays of the vehicle
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Figure 5-3. Avionics Layout in the ERV
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Figure 5-4. The Entry Research Vehicle
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6.0 FTP PACKAGING CONCEPT
The conceptual packaging design and sizing for the ERV FTP is based on available
circuit design information, plus several estimates and assumptions regarding environments
and physical constraints. This information is included here so that the assumptions are
obvious for critical review. Two cases were examined: one, for electronics satisfying the
basic requirements; and two, for electronics including a 50% reserve.
Much of the physical environment assumed would be transmitted from the Space
Shuttle payload bay through the ERV to its avionics bay. The maximum ambient temp-
erature in the ERV avionics bay has been estimated at 60 ° C. Although no levels have been
estimated, it is assumed that there would be significant transmitted vibration input, as well
as mechanical shock during flight boost phases. It is assumed that the avionics bay will be
reasonably dry and unpressurized.
The required physical characteristics of the package (form factor, mounting
interface, I/O connector location, etc.) are largely unspecified at this time. Volume, weight,
and power dissipation limits given were 2.5 cubic feet, 150 pounds, and 650 watts,
respectively. This study indicates that these numbers can be significantly reduced.
It is assumed that cooling for the FTP will be available in the form of a water-
cooled coldplate. Coldplate temperature is unspecified at this time, but 60 ° F has been
assumed because lower temperatures might cause sweating. Consideration will be given
to a resilient "coldplate" design to minimize structure and interface problems associated
with thermal stresses. This cooling approach is described in Section 6.1 and Appendix A.
A standard military packaging approach has been taken with respect to the
electronics. Assumptions in this area include:
1. Modules and backplane wiring will be multi-layer printed circuit.
2. Leaded array and DIP packages will be used for semiconductor
components.
3. Modules will require both heat sinking and stiffening.
4. Module guides will employ a wedge lock or cam lock device to provide
good heat transfer and positive locking in position.
5. The three electronics channels will be physically separated except for
interconnection of the shared hardware modules through backplane
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connectors.
6. Each channel will have its own modular power conversion unit and I/O
connectors to both the primary and auxiliary ERV power supplies.
7. Separate I/O connectors will be provided for each channel for each 1553
bus (including test) and for Air Data, Skid, and Radar Altimeter links.
8. The I/O connectors will be located on the front of the box.
A summary of the available circuit design information pertinent to the packaging
design is included in Section 6.2. The following electronics and power module sizing is
based on this information and design experience on similar packages.
For packaging on 6" x 9" printed circuit cards with approximately 45 square inches
of usable component area (excluding connectors), the board requirements per channel are
as follows:
Function Case 1 Case 2 (50%
CPUs 4 boards (2 per CPU) 6 (2 per CPU)
Shared Hardware 2 3
I/O 2 3
Total Boards/Channel 8 12
Total Power/Channel 65W Max 98W Max
Reserve)
The power conversion modules are estimated to be about 60% efficient and require
a volume equivalent to 1 cubic inch per watt supplied. The resulting volume and power
dissipation estimates are:
Case 1 Case
Volume 65 in3 98 in3
Power Dissipation 43W 65W
2 (50% Reserve)
An VI'P packaging concept based on electronics sizing and partitioning, I/O, and
possible thermal/structural requirements is illustrated in Figures 6-1 and 6-2. The power
modules are shown bolted to the rear wall of the box to maximize the heat sinking surface
contacted. Heavy walls are shown around all the channel partitions to both maximize heat
flow from all the electronics modules and provide a sturdy enclosure for all three channels.
The heavy walls can also be easily adapted to the resilient coldplate design. Material can be
removed selectively to minimize weight while retaining optimal thermal/structural
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Figure 6-1. ERV FTP Packaging Concept (Top View)
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Figure 6-2. ERV FTP Packaging Concept (Front View)
Each channel backplane is shown with connectors to provide interconnection with
the channel power module and I/O connectors, and also with the other channel backplanes.
An ahemate design possibility is an integral multi-layer PC board and flexible circuit for
each backplane. The flexible circuit portion could be designed to interface directly with the
intrachannel power module and I]O connectors,
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The FTP package can be EMI, moisture, and/or pressure sealed as required.
The estimated volume, weight, and power consumption of the conceptual designs
for each case is as follows:
Volume, ft 3
Weight, ib
Power, w
I Case 1 I Case 2 I Limit
1.4
90
325
1.9
120
490 --
2.5
150
650
6.1 RESILIENT COLDPLATE DESCRIPTION
A lightweight, compact, efficient, and reliable thermal interface scheme provides
improved heat transfer from electronics equipment to a heat sink. Conductive heat transfer
between chassis and heat sink has usually been across simple planar interfaces.
Temperature differences across these interfaces induce thermal stresses which cause
warpage and changes in the interface contact, particularly when the interface is over an
extended area. A scheme using tapered pins or wedges in mating holes or slots as a
thermal interface alleviates these problems.
For example, electronic equipments have been bolted to planar cold rails for
cooling. Thermally induced warpage has opened equipment cover seals and changed the
thermal interface resistance. Improvements have usually been brought about by the
addition of material and fasteners. A system using several tapered pins, mounted on an
appropriately bent coolant tube, which mate with tapered holes in the electronic equipment
chassis provides a solution to this problem. Stress relief bends in the coolant tube easily
remove the thermal _tress problem. The tapered pin and hole provide greater interface
pressure than would be achieved using the same mating force on the same area in a planar
mating situation. This greater contact pressure, in turn, increases the coefficient of hea_
transfer across the interface. This cooling scheme is illustrated in Appendix A, NASA
Tech Brief 71-10088, April, 1971.
6.2 ERV FTP ELECTRONICS INFORMATION
The ERV FTP will consist of three channels. Each channel contains four functions:
two CPUs, one Shared Hardware and one I/O Interface. Each channel will also have a
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power module converter. The following figures list an approximate device count for the
FTP by functional modules.
Device
MC68020
Quantity
1
1
4
16
25
5
Package
PGA
PGA
SIP
DIP
PGA
MC68881
SRAM
64Kx4
ROM
128 Kx 8
DIP
DIP
DIP
Figure 6-3. Device
Gate Array
7400 TI'L
PAL
Quantity
65
Drivers &
Receivers
Device Package
PGA
Size
inches
1.3 x 1.3
(113 pin)
1.0 x 1.0
(68 pin)
Power Dissipation
(per device)
1 Watt, 5 V
1 Watt, 5 V
Gate Array
7400 TrL
PAL 13
DIP
3.0 x 0.2
(x 0.6 high)
1.6 x 0.6
0.5W, 5 V
0.15 W, 5 V
Drivers &
Receivers
38
DIP
DIP
1.7 x 1.7
(181 pin)
1W, 5V
0.3 x 1.0
(20 pin)
0.3 x 1.2
(24 pin)
0.3 x 1.0
(20 pin)
Count for CPUs
0.1W, 5V
0.2 W, 5V
0.1 W, 5V
Size
inches
1.7 x 1.7
(181 pin)
0.3 x 1.0
(20 pin)
0.3 x 1.2
(24 pin)
0.3 x 1.0
(20 pin)
Power Dissipation
(per device)
1W, 5V
0.1W, 5 V
0.2 W, 5V
0.1 W, 5V
Figure 6-4. Device Count for Shared Hardware
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Device
Drivers &
Receiver
A/D
Convertor
D/A
Convertor
Track &Hold
Amplifier
PAL
Quantity
28
Package
DIP
DIP, Hybrid
DIP, Hybrid
Size
inches
0.3 x 1.0
(20 pin)
1.2 x 2.0
(32 pin)
1.2
(32
x 1.8
pin)
3
20
DIP, Hybrid
DIP
0.8 x 1.3
(24 pin)
0.3 x 1.3
(24 pin)
Power Dissipation
(per device)
o.lw@5v
0.75 W @ +15 V
1.2 W @ -15 V
1.1 W@ +5V
0.75 W @ +15 V
0.53 W @ -15 V
0.2W@+5V
0.45 W @ +15 V
0.45 W @ -15 V
0.05 W @ +5 V
0.2W@ 5V
Total
Device
Drivers &
Receiver
A/D
Convertor
Figure 6-5.
Quantity
50 in 2 22.9 W
Device Count for Channel A I/0
Package
42 DIP
DIP, Hybrid
Size
inches
0.3 x 1.0
(20 pin)
1.2 x 2.0
(32 pin)
Power Dissipation
(per device)
0.1W@5V
0.75 W @ +15 V
1.2 W@ -15 V
D/A
Convertor
Track &Hold
Ampfifier
RAM
Dual Ported
PAL
7400 "IlL
2
25
DIP, Hybrid
DIP, Hybrid
DIP
DIP
1.2
(32
0.8
(24
0.6
(48
0.3
x 1.8
pin)
x 1.3
pin)
x 2.5
pin)
x 1.3
1.1 W@ +5V
0.75 W @ +15 V
0.53 W @ -15 V
0.2W@+5V
0.45 W @ +15 V
0.45 W @ -15 V
0.05 W @ +5 V
o.4w@5v
o.2w@5v
Total
2 DIP
Figure 6-6.
(24 pin)
0.3 x 1.0
(20 pin)
0.1W, 5V
67 in 2 26.3 W
Device Count for Channel B I/O
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Device
Drivers &
Receiver
AID
Convertor
Quantity
42
3
Package
DIP
DIP, Hybrid
Size
inches
0.3 x 1.0
(20 pin)
1.2 x 2.0
(32 pin)
Power Dissipation
(per device)
O.lW@5V
0.75 W @ +15 V
1.2 W @ -15 V
1.1W@ +5V
D/A
Convertor
Track &Hold
Amplifier
RAM
Dual Ported
PAL
2
3
2
25
DIP, Hybrid
DIP, Hybrid
DIP
DIP
1.2 x 1.8
(32 pin)
0.8 x 1.3
(24 pin)
0.6 x 2.5
(48 pin)
0.3 x 1.3
0.75 W @ +15 V
0.53 W @ -15 V
0.2W@+5V
0.45 W @ +15 V
0.45 W @ -15 V
0.05 W @ +5 V
0.4W@ 5V
o.2w@5v
0.1W, 5V7400 TIT,
Total
2
(24 pin)
DIP 0.3 x 1.0
(20 pin)
71 in 2
Figure 6-7.
27.8 W
Device Count for Channel C I10
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7.0 AVIONICS RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
This section presents a reliability study of the ERV avionics. This document was
originally released (as ERV-87-05) at the Architecture Design Midterm Review in January
1987 and again (as ERV-87-12) at the Final Review in July 1987. It has been updated to
reflect feedback from those meetings and additional analysis that has been suggested.
Since the ERV avionics is still in the definition phase, an approach which
contributes to the evolution of the vehicle design was undertaken to study the flight
electronics' reliability. Markov models were employed as the means of obtaining the
analytical failure probabilities. These figures were complemented with qualitative listings
of electronic requirements and availability. The method proved successful. It resulted in
the redesign of some areas of the hardware redundancy. The approach is described in
detail in Section 7.1.
The criticalness of each of the ERV input/output (I/O) devices is examined in
Section 7.2. Information for this section was obtained from the Task 1 final report
[Kriegsman et al] and from consultations with B. Kriegsman of CSDL. That section
examines the I/O devices in the context of vehicle survival and mission success.
Several iterations of an ERV strawman architecture have been developed. The latest
of these was used to determine the availability of the various I/O devices in the presence of
flight computer failures. Those listings are presented in Section 7.3.
The flight computer (including its attached I/O) for ERV was assumed to have
failure characteristics that resemble Markov processes. Several Markov models were
developed to exploit this trait. They are described in Section 7.5. The failure rates that
were used in those models are based upon the latest ERV schematic. Section 7.4 presents
the figures and explains how they were derived. Finally, Section 7.6 combines the
models and the failure rates and discusses the modelling results.
7.1 METHODOLOGY FOR THE RELIABILITY STUDY
The following is a description of the methodology that was employed for the
reliability analyses of the ERV architecture design. Preliminary analysis on the subject and
discussions with NASA/Langley led to the decision to use this approach for the baseline
study to be completed under this contract.
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The goal of this method was threefold: to conservatively limit the reliability studies
that were performed under Task 7; to study the reliability of the Fault-Tolerant Processor
(FTP) and its I/O cross-strapping, not necessarily the reliability of the I/O itself; and to
provide valuable feedback to the design process about hardware redundancy.
The method is a four point iterative analysis based upon reliability of the core b-TP
and its electronic interfaces. The four points (FTP model, I/O criticalness, I/O availability,
assuring success) are discussed below.
7.1.1 FTP MARKOV MODEL
The core FTP with its interfacing electronics will be modelled as a Markov process
with the eight possible final states or modes:
Channels On-Line
Mode A 13 C Confi_ration
7 1 1 1 Triplex
6 1 1 0 A & B duplex
5 1 0 1 A & C duplex
4 1 0 0 A simplex
3 0 1 1 B & C duplex
2 0 1 0 B simplex
1 0 0 1 C simplex
0 0 0 0 None operational
Triplex operation (mode 7) is a fully operational FTP. Mission/vehicle 3 success is
assured (with respect to the flight computer).
Duplex operation (modes 6, 5, and 3) is a degraded but operational FTP. Vehicle
success is nearly assured. (This will be determined from the qualitative analysis described
in Section 7.1.3 and Section 7.1.4.)
Simplex operation (modes 4, 2, and 1) is a doubly-degraded b'TP. It is operational
3Since the vehicle is the mission, the terms are interchangeable. Vehicle success will be used
predominantly in this report.
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only because of good coverage by the FDIR (Fault Detection, Isolation, and Recovery)
routines. Graceful degradation from duplex is not guaranteed. Also, mission/vehicle
success is not necessarily assured if the FTP is operating in simplex, since interfaces to
some critical I/O may not be triplicated. (Again, this will be seen in Section 6.1.3 and
Section 7.1.4.)
Mode 0 would be a catastrophic failure (two failures before recovery, or three
failures, etc.). It would cause both mission and vehicle loss since the flight computer
........would not be operational.
These 8 modes refine previous Markov models which gave death states of "Fail-
Catastrophic" and "Fail-Safe". Mode 0 is now the catastrophic failure state while the other
modes increase the granularity of the paths to that state. Note that there can be no Fail-Safe
operation (graceful shutdown of the computer) since there is no secondary pilot (automatic
or human) to take control of flight.
A model has been developed (Section 7.5) to implement the scenario described
above. State transition probabilities were obtained (Section 7.4) by roughly sizing the
electronics in each channel and determining kpa, Xpb, 7_¢, and _ (each processor and
interstage). Xl_a may or may not equal Xl_b, etc., because of the differences in electronics
in each channel. That is, the interface electronics to the I/O modules would be included in
kp.
We make the tacit assumption that _. = 0 for the I/O devices themselves. An order
of magnitude estimation of the required failure rate for each I/O device has been provided,
however. (For example, the star tracker must have _ < 10 -7 failures/hour.) This is termed
PCDL and is described in Section 7.5.3.
7.1.2 I/O CRITICALNESS
Based upon expertise in the field of flight guidance, navigation and control, lists of
the minimum complement of I/O required for mission and vehicle success have been
compiled. There may be several of these lists, since, for example, a GPS and radar
altimeter combination could cover for the MLS.
Assume that navaids V, W, X, Y, & Z are available. Lists of those navaids which
would be minimally required for vehicle success may be:
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Listl List2 List3
V V V
W or X or W or
Y Y Z
Z
... etc.
The above would mean that the ERV vehicle could not survive without navaid V,
but navaid W could be lost if navaids X and Z were present, etc. These lists are
accompanied by qualitative description of each I/O device's function in the system.
7.1.3 AVAILABLE I/O
For each of the 8 possible operational modes of the FTP, a list of accessible I/O can
be determined from the latest avionics schematic. For example:
Mode Confi_mtign A.v.aila_,..]_
7 Triplex, ABC 3V, 3W, 2X, 2Y, Z
6 Duplex, AB 3V, 2W, X, 2Y, Z
5 Duplex, AC etc.
4 Simplex, A V, W, Y
3 Duplex, BC etc.
2 Simplex, B V, W, Z
1 Simplex, C V, W
0 failed none
From this list and the ones compiled in Section 7.1.2, we can determine that only
mode 1 is a vehicle loss mode (only V and W available). Then we can say,
P{vehicle loss} = P{0} + P{ 1 } + P{other critical event}
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7.1.4 ASSURING SUCCESS
If from the calculations in Section 7.1.3 it is determined that P{vehicle loss} >
10 -7, then we need to make mode 1 a non-vehicle loss mode. This is because we cannot
(easily) decrease P{ 1 } or P{0}. The only means, then, to decrease P{vehicle loss} is to
eliminate P{ 1} from affecting it.
Qualitatively scanning the results, we see that we can make mode 1 a non-vehicle
loss mode by assuring that navaid Y or Z is available to channel C (triplicate navaid Y?,
duplicate Z?).
Thus qualitative iterations of Section 7.1.3 and Section 7.1.4 will assure that the
FTP and its I/O architecture will meet the desired reliability numbers (10 -7 vehicle loss,
10 -6 mission loss).
7.1.5 SUMMARY OF METHODOLOGY
This approach is a qualitative one based upon the analytical numbers obtained from
the FTP model. Using the basic lists described here, it can be assured that the avionics
meet the required reliability. Also from this procedure, it can be determined if too much I/O
redundancy has been designed into the system (if none of the modes in Section 7.1.3
provide a minimum complement, i.e., they all have more than enough I/O).
7.2 Criticalness of ERV I/O
The ERV I/O architecture implements a mixed redundancy of the attached avionics.
The replication of the various devices will be a function of their individual reliability and
criticalness - that is, how crucial their operation is for mission and vehicle success.
This section discusses the criticalness of all the ERV I/O for a typical mission. The
8 hour flight is described by these attributes:
1. deployment from Shuttle to in-atmosphere plane change
2. return to low-Earth orbit for two revolutions
3. entry (with blackout)
4. landing in desert area
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The mission is defined in more detail in the ERV Task 1 Report [Kreigsman et al], pages.
4-99 through 4-100.
The I/O items are divided into three categories: Flight Control, Navaids, and non-
GN&C. This is a convenient categorization of the devices and does not imply mutual
exclusion. That is, the navaids are certainly an integral part of the flight control system and
their separate grouping does not connote independence from it.
The function of each I/O device is briefly described. Following this are the
consequences of device loss. Also discussed with these consequences is the coverage that
any other I/O device could provide in the event of failure. For example, a radar altimeter
and GPS combination can cover for a failed MLS.
7.2.1 FLIGHT CONTROL I/O
The I/O items discussed below perform flight control on the ERV. The majority of
these devices will have triply replicated hardware interfaces. The initial assumption (for
this study) is that no other controller can be substituted for any of the devices. In addition,
because the devices are so critical in flight control, loss of any of them will result in vehicle
loss. That is, the failure of any of the following devices will result in system loss.
These assumptions may not necessarily be valid, but are used because of a lack of
detailed information (at this time) about the ERV flight controlling devices. A more
rigorous analysis would prepare true minimum complement lists for the control items.
(The above assumption sets the minimum list to all devices.)
Although the Laser Inertial Navigation System (LINS) plays a crucial role in flight
control, it is not discussed in this section. Rather, it is presented with navaids I/O since the
required accuracy for flight control is far less than that for navigation.
The flight control I/O devices are as follows:
. SKIDS, FORWARD & AFT
The landing skids are located at the forward and aft sections of the plane. They
are highly critical at the time of landing only. Triplex electronics will control
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their action. 4
. REACTION CONTROL SYSTEM (RCS) JETS, FORWARD & AFT
Nineteen RCS thrusters control the attitude maneuvers of the vehicle. While
some RCS jet failures can be tolerated by the system without vehicle or mission
loss, all interface electronics to them will be triply replicated to assure aircraft
survival.
3. MAIN ENGINES
Three engines will provide the main thrust for the vehicle. Although an engine
failure can be tolerated, it was assumed for this study that the engines are of
utmost importance for vehicle success. Electronic interfaces will be triply
redundant.
4. TIP FINS, STARBOARD AND PORT
The tip f'ms provide rudder and braking control of the vehicle. Interface to each
of them will be triply redundant.
5. ELEVONS, STARBOARD AND PORT
The elevons control the pitch and roll of the vehicle. Triplex electronic interface
to them will be provided.
6. BODY FLAP
The body flap modifies the flight characteristics at various speeds. Its primary
function is to control the longitudinal trim. Interface to it will be triply
redundant.
7. AIR DATA (SEADS).
Air data measurements will be taken through 14 triply redundant pressure
transducers located in orifices in the vehicle nose cap. Airspeed, dynamic
pressure, and wind relative attitudes are provided to the flight control system in
the FTP. Some data will also be used for experimentation input.
4Dual-redundancy was the initial skid design. This stu_ty has resulted in the decision to triplicate skid
electronics.
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As with the RCS jets, some transducer failures can be tolerated by the system
without vehicle or mission loss. For this sto_ly, however, it will be assumed
that the loss of the devices is vehicle critical and no coverage is available from
other I/O.
7.2.2 NAVAID I/O
Five navaids in the I/O network provide vital information to the GN&C algorithms.
A thorough discussion of these aids was prepared by B. Kriegsman (as ERV-87-01). The
following is a summary of that paper.
1. LASER INERTIAL NAVIGATION SYSTEM (LINS)
Since it is not affected by atmospheric blackout, the LINS is the sole navaid
which can provide position and velocity information throughout the entire ERV
flight. It is a critical component of the navigation system and will be dual
redundant: two LINS units will be provided in the vehicle.
The LINS alignment, position, and velocity estimates must continually be
updated, however, in order to compensate for various navigation errors that
occur throughout the mission. Such updates must be implemented immediately
before deployment and before major aerodynamic and propulsive maneuvers.
Other navaids must provide the LINS alignment data, either directly (star
tracker) or indirectly using error correlations (GPS). The GPS must provide
position and velocity updates.
Consequences of and Coverage for Failure: No other navaid can cover for a
failed LINS. Loss of (both) LINS would result in vehicle loss.
2. STELLAR-UPDATE DEVICE; STAR TRACKER OR SCANNER
A star tracker is an excellent device for LINS realignment. Before deployment
from the Shuttle, an on-board tracker will align the LINS. The tracker will also
be used to update the alignment before major aerodynamic and propulsive
bums. Because of high expense and other navaid coverage, only one tracker
will be provided aboard the vehicle, although two interfaces to it wiI1 be
present. ,,
Consequences of and Coverage for Failure: The sole purpose of the star tracker
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is LINS Inertial Measuring Unit (IMU) alignment. While not as accurate, the
Shuttle tracker can be used to provide pre-deployment data to the LINS, should
the ERV tracker fail before flight. (If this occurs, however, aborting the
mission should be considered.) Once in flight, the GPS can serve to align the
IMU but only by correlation between alignment error and position and velocity
errors. This error cross-correlation method requires an IMU-sensed change in
velocity, i.e., an aerodynamic or propulsive maneuver.
3. GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM (GPS) RECEIVER
The GPS provides the IMU with position and velocity data before major
aerodynamic and propulsive maneuvers. It suffers from radio blackout during
entry, but its blackout period is less than other radio-navaid systems (e.g.,
TACAN, VOR/DME) since it operates at higher frequencies. Once through
blackout, it provides the means of updating the IMU-derived position and
velocity estimates for landing. As such, the GPS has the sole responsibility of
providing navigation data to the flight control system to enable the vehicle to be
within range of the MLS. Thus, it is an extremely valuable navaid for ERV.
Two GPS receiver units will be provided on-boar&
Consequences of and Coverage for Failure: Failure of the GPS will mean
system loss, since after entry it is the sole means of updating the horizontal
plane position and velocity estimates.
4. MICROWAVE LANDING SYSTEM (MLS)
The MLS considered for ERV will be the same as provided in the Shuttle: a
microwave scanning beam landing system. The MLS provides excellent
azimuth, elevation, and range data. Additionally, the MLS information is
provided with respect to the landing site, not the local terrain, and position-fix
accuracy is increased as the site is approached.
Consequences of and Coverage for Failure: Although an excellent facility for
landing, the MLS can probably be replaced by the GPS, LINS, and radar
altimeter. The GPS/LINS will provide accurate landing information in the
horizontal plane. Altitude data assistance from the radar altimeter is required for
the vertical channel.
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5. RADAR/RADIO ALTIMETER
The radar altimeter is used to measure z position over the _ terrain.
Consequences of and Coverage for Failure: Loss of the altimeter is not critical.
In conjunction with the GPS/LINS, the altimeter will provide coverage for the
MLS. Thus, in effect, loss of the altimeter can be covered by the MLS.
7.2.3 NoN-GN&C I/O
Several I/O devices on the vehicle do not provide GN&C data. They are listed in
this section.
1. GROUND SUPPORT ELECTRONICS (GSE)
The GSE is used only for pre- and post-flight checkout. Two GSE units will
be provided on-board.
Consequences of and Coverage for Failure: Should the GSE fail before flight,
aborting the mission should be considered, since knowledge about the condition
of the other avionics will be dubious. Once in flight, however, GSE failure will
not harm the mission or vehicle.
2. TELEMETRY
The function of telemetry on the vehicle is still in question. "Wake up" and
"self-destruct" are two messages under consideration. Definition beyond that is
subject to further examination.
Consequences of and Coverage for Failure: Loss of telemetry to the vehicle
could result in both vehicle and mission loss, since a "wake-up" message may
never be received. However since this is only during the first seconds of the
mission and the telemetry will be subject to GSE checkout in the STS bay, only
one telemetry unit will be provided. Loss of "self-destruct" information may be
a more serious problem, however, and should be studied further. At this point,
loss of vehicle telemetry will not be accounted for in the reliability studies since
it is a very unlikely occurrence and it is still in a def'mition phase.
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3. EXPERIMENT AND EXPERIMENT TELEMETRY
The experiment aboard the vehicle will vary with each mission. It will have no
replicated hardware interface to the flight computer.
Consequences of and Coverage for Failure: Loss of experimentation and its
telemetry will not affect the vehicle. Mission failure may result, depending
upon the state of the experiment at the time of failure.
4. ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL SYSTEM (ECS)
The Environmental Control System includes the following subsystems: battery
control, tank pressurization, and cooling. All interfaces will be duplex since the
devices should be fairly reliable.
Consequences of and Coverage for Failure: Loss of any ECS system will result
in the loss of power to the flight computer and/or to the actuators. Engines may
also fail due to lack of fuel. In any case, vehicle loss will be the result. ECS
subsystems can not be covered by any other device.
7.2.4 MINIMUM COMPLEMENT OF I/O
Based upon the above descriptions, lists of the minimum complement of I/O
required for vehicle success can be compiled. The function of these lists is discussed in
Section 7.1.2.
7.2.4.1 MINIMUM COMPLEMENT OF I]O FOR VEHICLE SUCCESS
There are four lists of I/O required for vehicle success. The lists all contain the
items described in Section 7.2.1 above. The items in Section 7.2.2 have some inter-
changeability and account for the list differences. Section 7.2.3 items are not all vehicle
critical.
Lists C and D assume that upon loss of the star tracker the mission is immediately
aborted and the vehicle is returned to Earth. When the tracker is lost, IMU realignment can
only be based upon error correlation between position and velocity readings (from the
GPS) and alignment readings. This method of error cross-correlation cannot be performed
during gravitation-only flight paths: propulsive or aerodynamic maneuvering is required.
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Nevertheless, the accuracy of this method is not welldetermined and, it should not be used
to complete the mission.
List A
Skids, F & A
RCS Jets, F & A
Main Engines
Tip Fins, S & P
Elevons, S & P
Body Flap
Air Data
LINS
GPS
Star Tracker
MLS
ECS
List B
Skids, F & A
RCS Jets, F & A
Main Engines
Tip Fins, S & P
Elevons, S & P
Body Flap
Air Data
LINS
GPS
Star Tracker
Radar Altimeter
ECS
List C
Skids, F & A
RCS Jets, F & A
Main Engines
Tip Fins, S & P
Elevons, S & P
Body Flap
Air Data
LINS
GPS
Radar Altimeter
ECS
List D
Skids, F & A
RCS Jets, F & A
Main Engines
Tip Fins, S & P
Elevons, S & P
Body Flap
Air Data
LINS
GPS
MLS
ECS
Figure 7.1. Minimum Complement of I/O for Vehicle Success
7.3 AVAILABILITY OF ERV I/O
Because the ERV architecture employs three MIL-STD-1553B buses cross-strapped
to two channels each, the association of an I/O device with a channel is not straight-
forward. However, the ERV reliability study methodology (as outlined in Section 7.1)
requires some identification of an I/O device with a channel. More precisely, the study
requires a correlation between channel failure and loss of I/O device.
It is no accident that the I/O architecture avoids a correlation between channel faults
and device loss. Indeed, if a rigid link existed, many costly (in weight, power, size, and
dollars) I/O devices would need triplex replication. The architecture designed for the ERV
allows for less than triplex replication of I/O.
In view of this, the following "availability" lists cannot be construed as final, rigid
results. Modelling will need to account for this lack of total correlation between channel
fault and device loss. The modelling process may be somewhat iterative.
7.3.1 I/O AVAILABILITY (CHANNEL)
Using latest schematics of the ERV avionics as a guide, the availability lists for the
ERV I/O (per channel) are compiled in Figure 7-2. The lists assume that a faulty channel
cannot cause a failure in an attached 1553 bus. This assumption is not without foundation:
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monitor/interlocks - which shut down a failed channel's outputs - can be developed which
will prevent channel failures from propagating to a 1553 bus.
Channel A List
Air Data
Forward Skids
Aft Skids
Radar Altimeter
Microwave Landing System
Telemetry
LINS #1
GPS #1
Star Tracker
Mid ECS
Aft ECS
Battery Control
Tank Pressurization
Forward RCS Jets
Aft RCS Jets
Main Engines
Elevons
Tip Fins
Experiment
Experiment Telemetry
Channel B List
Air Data
Forward Skids
Aft Skids
Radar Altimeter
Ground Support #1
Telemetry
LINS #2
GPS #1
GPS #2
Star Tracker
Mid ECS
Aft ECS
Battery Control
Tank Pressurization
Forward RCS Jets
Aft RCS Jets
Main Engines
Elevons
Tip Fins
Experiment Telemetry
Channel C List
Air Data
Forward Skids
Aft Skids
Microwave Landing System
Ground Support #2
LINS #1
LINS #2
GPS #2
Star Tracker
Mid ECS
Aft ECS
Battery Control
Tank Pressurization
Forward RCS
Aft RCS Jets
Main Engines
Elevons
Tip Fins
Experiment
Figure 7-2. I10 Availability per Channel
7.3.2 I/O AVAILABILITY (OPERATIONAL MODE)
From Section 7.3.1, availability lists based upon mode of operation can be
compiled. (Modes of operation are discussed in Section 7.1.1.) The following lists are not
exactly of the type discussed in Section 7.1.3. Here, an item is listed as available if there is
at least one connection to it.
Mode
7
Configuration
Triplex, ABC
Available I/O
Air Data; Forward Skids; Aft Skids; Radar Altimeter;,
MLS; GSE #1; GSE #2; Telemetry; LINS #1; LINS
#2; GPS #1; GPS #2; Star Tracker, Mid ECS; Aft
ECS; Battery Control; Tank Pressurization; Forward
RCS Jets; Aft RCS Jets; Main Engines; Elevons; Tip
Fins; Experiment; Experiment Telemetry.
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6
5
4
0
Duplex, AB
Duplex, AC
Simplex, A
Duplex, BC
Simplex, B
Simplex, C
failed
Air Data; Forward Skids; Aft Skids; Radar Altimeter,
MLS; GSE #1; Telemetry; LINS #1; LINS #2; GPS
#1; GPS #2; Star Tracker; Mid ECS; Aft ECS;
Battery Control; Tank Pressurization; Forward RCS
Jets; Aft RCS Jets; Main Engines; Elevons; Tip Fins;
Experiment; Experiment Telemetry.
Air Data; Forward Skids; Aft Skids; Radar Altimeter,
MLS; GSE #2; Telemetry; LINS #1; LINS #2; GPS
#1; GPS #2; Star Tracker, Mid ECS; Aft ECS;
Battery Control; Tank Pressurization; Forward RCS
Jets; Aft RCS Jets; Main Engines; Elevons; Tip Fins;
Experiment; Experiment Telemetry.
Air Data; Forward Skids; Aft Skids; Radar Altimeter
MLS; Telemetry; LINS #1; GPS #1; Star Tracker;,
Mid ECS; Aft ECS; Battery Control; Tank
Pressurization; Forward RCS Jets; Aft RCS Jets;
Main Engines; Elevons; Tip Fins; Experiment;
Experiment Telemetry.
Air Data; Forward Skids; Aft Skids; Radar Altimeter;, I
MLS; GSE #1; GSE #2; Telemetry; LINS #1; LINS
#2; GPS #1; GPS #2; Star Tracker; Mid ECS; Aft
ECS; Battery Control; Tank Pressurization; Forward
RCS Jets; Aft RCS Jets; Main Engines; Elevons; Tip
Fins; Experiment; Experiment Telemetry.
Air Data; Forward Skids; Aft Skids; Radar Altimeter,
GSE #1; Telemetry; LINS #2; GPS #1; GPS #2; Star
Tracker, Mid ECS; Aft ECS; Battery Control; Tank
Pressurization; Forward RCS Jets; Aft RCS Jets;
Main Engines; Elevons; Tip Fins; Experiment
Telemetry.
Air Data; Forward Skids; Aft Skids; MLS; GSE #2;
LINS #1; LINS #2; GPS #2; Star Tracker; Mid ECS;
Aft ECS; Battery Control; Tank Pressurization;
Forward RCS Jets; Aft RCS Jets; Main Engines;
Elevons; Tip Fins; Experiment.
none
Figure 7-3. Vehicle I/0 Availability
7.3.3 SUMMARY OF AVAILABILITY LISTS
The lists given in this report are for use with the reliability studies to be performed
on the ERV under Task 7. This study is a preliminary one which stresses the qualitative
analyses due to the imprecise definition of the vehicle, its avionics, and its missions. The
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lists, then, should not be c0nstrued as formal and final studies in themselves. The
interdependence of the avionics design and its own reliability forces these lists to be used in
an iterative process which will point to an ideal flight electronics system for the vehicle.
7.4 AVIONICS FAILURE RATES
Equations and formulas for calculating failure rates are quite complex. Much must
be known about a device before its failure rate can be accurately calculated. Because we are
in the early stages of the ERV flight computer design, specific devices within the system- .........
are not known. Failure rate estimations were, therefore, based upon MIL-HDBK-217D
guidelines, Reliability Prediction of Electronic Equipment, January 1982.
The following three sections assume familiarity with the latest ERV avionics
schematics. They have been discussed in the previous sections of this volume.
7.4.1 FAILURE RATE FACTORS
Many factors are involved in determining the failure of a particular device including
its complexity, its packaging, and the environment it is used in. The general equation from
MIL-HDBK-217D for calculating the failure rate per 106 hours, 3.p, of a microelectronic
device is:
_.p -- _Q*[(CI*_T*_V)+(C2+C3)*_E]*7_L
where
/tQ is the quality factor and is determined by the quality of the device.
C 1 and C 2 are device coml_lexity failure rates based upon the transistor
count for linear devices, the gate count for logic devices, or the bit count for
memory devices.
_T is the temperature acceleration factor based upon the technology of the
part.
7rv is the voltage derating stress factor which is dependent upon the supply
voltage of the device.
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C 3 is the package complexity failure rate based upon the number of
functional pins on the device.
7rE is the application environment factor.
_L is the device learning factor based upon the age of the technology of the
device.
7.4.1.1 DEVICE QUALITY
The quality of a part, as one can see from the equation, has a linear effect on the
part's failure rate. Many parts are covered by specifications that have several quality levels.
There are three basic military-standard quality levels, S, B, and C, and a commercial
quality level D. The MIL-HDBK-217D assigns values to _ for each quality level:
Ouality Level /tQ Description
S 0.5 Class S qualification is the highest a device
can have. It means the device has been
procured in full accordance with MIL-M-
38510, Class S requirements. Class S is
most often associated with the term "Space
Qualified."
B 1.0 To qualify as a Class B part, a device must be
procured in full accordance with MIL-M-
38510, Class B requirements.
C 8.0 To qualify as a Class C part, a device must be
procured in full accordance with MIL-M-
38510, Class C requirements.
D 17.5 A part qualifies as Class D if it is hermetically
sealed with no screening beyond the
manufacturer's regular quality assurance
practices.
In calculating the failure rate of the ERV flight computer it was assumed that Space
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Qualified (Class S) parts would be used.
7.4.1.2 DEVICE COMPLEXITY FAILURE RATES
C 1 and C 2 are polynomial functions of the transistor count for linear devices, the
gate count for logic devices, and the bit count for memory devices. The functions vary
with component size and device technology. The handbook includes look-up tables for
these values.
7.4.1.3 TEMPERATURE ACCELERATION FACTOR
The temperature acceleration factor, XT, is based upon the device's capability to
perform under extreme temperatures. It takes into account a number of the device
characteristics and the temperature of its operating environment. The equation for XT is:
_T -- O. l*eX
where:
X = -A*[ 1/(Tj+273) - 1/298]
A is a value taken from the MIL-HDBK-217D based on the device's seal
and technology.
Tj is the devices worst case junction temperature which is based upon the
device's thermal resistance, its worst case power dissipation and the
temperature of its operating environment.
The most dominant contributors to the temperature acceleration factor are the
device's thermal resistance and its operating environment temperature. Their effect on the
overall failure rate of a device can be seen in Figures 7-4 and 7-5. The data in the figures
were taken from the failure rate calculations of the gate array used in the VLSI FTP 5. As
can be seen from the graphs, both the thermal resistance of a device and its environment's
temperature axe significant factors to the devices failure rate. If these two factors are
controlled, the reliability of a device can be increased. To lower the thermal resistance of a
5As part of an internal research and development effort, CSDL has designed and fabricated a miniaturized
version of the Langley AIRLAB FTP.
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device, eutectic die attaches should be used.
3O
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Failures versus Thermal Resistance
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DIPs with Epoxy
or Glass Die Attaches
(CMOS devices)
Figure 7-4. Device Failure Rate versus Thermal Resistance
Typical temperatures of a few environments are noted in Figure 7-5. The ERV
flight computer will operate in an environment that will not exceed 60" C. For conservative
measures, failure rates were calculated using a temperature factor that corresponds with
with an ambient temperature of 60" C.
1.4
-_ 1.2
1.0"
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Failure Rate versus Temperature
/ _Airbome, Uninhabited,
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Grou_ Benign J
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Figure 7-5. Gate Array Failure Rate versus Temperature
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7.4.1.4 VOLTAGE DERATING STRESS FACTOR
The voltage derating stress factor is dependent upon the supply voltage of the
device. For a supply voltage of 5 volts, _v = 1.0 and it has no effect on the failure rate
calculation for a particular device. It was assumed in this study that all devices would have
supply voltages of 5 volts and _v was ignored.
7.4.1.5 PACKAGE COMPLEXITY FAILURE RATE
C 3 is a polynomial function of the number of functional pins on a particular device.
The functions vary with component size and device technology. The handbook contains
look-up tables where values for C 3 can be found.
7.4.1.6 APPLICATION ENVIRONMENT FACTOR
The application environment factor, gE, includes the effects of environmental stress
on a device in the reliability analysis. The MIL-HDBK-217D gives a list of descriptions of
typical operating environments for electronic equipment along with their associated values
for gE- These environments range from a immobile, laboratory environment where rcE =
0.38 to a cannon, launch environment where gE = 220. The first estimate of gE for the
ERV flight computer in ERV-87-05 suggested that the computer would operate in an
environment similar to a missile, launch environment. The missile, launch environment
includes severe conditions related to missile launch and space vehicle boost into orbit and to
vehicle re-entry and landing by parachute. After review, it was determined that this
environment description is more severe than the environment in which the ERV flight
computer will operate. It is assumed that the avionics in the ERV will be powered down
during the shuttle boost into orbit and the ERV will not free fall through the atmosphere and
land by parachute as described in the missile, launch environment. The flight computer
operating environment will be more like the airborne, uninhabited cargo (Auc)
environment as described in MIL-HDBK-217D which includes extreme pressure,
vibration, and temperature cycling similar to that endured in equipment bays of long
mission transport aircraft. The handbook states that the temperature in the AUC
environment ranges up to 90" C. It was assumed, that the environmental control system in
the ERV will keep the flight computers ambient temperature below 60" C.
Although when the ERV flight computer is in orbit, the environment will be much
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less severe than an AUC environment. Conservative measures were taken once again and
_E (3.0) for the AUC environment was used in all calculations of device failure rates.
Figure 7-6 shows a device's failure rate versus some typical environments.
Processor Failure Rate versus Environment
lOO
8o
6o
4o
o
Figure 7-6.
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Application Environment at 60 degress C
Microprocessor Failure Rate versus Environment
7.4.1.7 DEVICE LEARNING FACTOR
The device learning factor XL depends on how long the device has been in
production. For a device that has been in production for at least four months, gL = 1.0 and
it does not affect the reliability of a device. This was the case assumed in the ERV flight
computer failure rate determination.
7.4.2 ERV FTP FAILURE RATE
The hardware failure rate of the ERV flight computer was derived using the Very
Large Scale Integration/Very High Speed Integrated Circuit (VLSI/VHSIC) FTP as a
model. The VLSI FTP is being developed at CSDL with the objective of continuing the
development of the FTP and producing a practical sized, VLSI/VI-ISIC FTP with sufficient
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throughput to handle a wide range of DoD and NASA applications. This makes the VLSI
FTP a suitable hardware model of the ERV flight computer.
The VLSI FTP processor and interstage failure rates were calculated by adding the
failure rates of the individual devices constituting the processor and interstage which, in
turn, were determined from MIL-HDBK-217D standards as discussed in the previous
section. Failure rates of the processor and interstage were determined based solely on
failures of solid state devices and interconnections. All devices were assumed to be Space
Quality and an airborne, uninhabited cargo environment was assumed as suggested by the
handbook. Failures of power supplies and backplanes were not considered. Failure rates
of the processor and interstage were based upon failure rates of the following devices:
Quantity in Quantity in
Processor In_rstage F_ilure Rate (per 10621__
Microprocessor 2 - 0.32
Floating-point CP 2 - 0.32
64K x 4 static RAM 4 - 6.0
128K x 8 Bipolar ROM 16 - 2.6
VLSI Gate Array 3 - 0.31
7400 "IlL (worst case) 80 35 0.02
PALs 10 4 0.15
Ddvers_eceivers 35 - 0.03
Connectors 4 1 0.16
Total Failure Rate: Processor Failure Rate: 72.6 failures/106 hours.
Interstage Failure Rate: 1.5 failures/106 hours.
Figure 7-7 is a graphical look at the failure rates of the individual components
comprising the processor. In ERV-87-05 it was assumed that the processor would contain
1 Mbyte of RAM and 1 Mbyte ROM. The failure rate of the RAM clearly dominated the
overall failure rate of the processor. Based upon CSDL previous experiences, 128 Kbytes
is typically sufficient for flight computers with execution requirements similar to the ERV.
However, more ROM may be needed. With an increase in ROM storage, the failure rates
of RAM and ROM are similar and the overall processor failure rate is much less.
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Fig ure 7.7. Processor Failures by Device
Failure rates of the interfaces to the 170 devices were also calculated. The I/O
interfaces were assumed to be composed of the following parts with the following failure
rates:
Device Quantity Failures per million hours
Channel Core to IOB Interface - 1.2 failures/106 hours.
Bus Controller 1 x 0.09 -- 0.09
Bus Arbiter 1 x 0.05 -- 0.05
Driver/Receiver 8 x 0.033 - 0.26
PAL 4 x 0.15 = 0.6
Connector 1 x 0.16 --- 0.16
IOB to Air Data Interface - 4.0 failures/10 6 hours.
Driver/Receiver 4 x 0.033 - 0.13
Analog/Digital Converter 1 x 1.8 = 1.8
Analog Multiplexer 1 x 0.4 = 0.4
Track/Hold Amplifier 1 x 0.9 = 0.9
Decoder/PAL 4 x 0.15 = 0.6
Connector 1 x 0.16 = 0.16
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IOB to Skids Interface - 5.4 failures/106
Driver/Receiver
Digital/Analog Converter
Analog/Digital Converter
Analog Multiplexer
Track.old Amplifier
Decoder/PAL
Connector
IOB to Radar Altimeter Interface - 4.0
Driver/Receiver
.......... ____alog/Digital Converter
Analog Multiplexer
Track/Hold Amplifier
Decoder/PAL
Connector
IOB to GSE Interface - 2.3 failures/106
Bus Controller R.T. Interface
PAL
Driver/Receiver
Connector
IOB to 1553 Interface - 2.3 failures/106
Bus Controller R.T. Interface
PAL
Driver/Receiver
Connector
hours.
4 x 0.033 - 0.13
1 x 1.4 = 1.4
1 x 1.8 = 1.8
1 x 0.4 = 0.4
1 x 0.9 = 0.9
4 x 0.15 - 0.6
1 x 0.16 = 0.16
failures/106 hours.
4 x 0.033 = 0.13
1 x 1.8 - 1.8
1 x 0.4 = 0.4
1 x 0.9 = 0.9
4 x 0.15 = 0.6
1 x 0.16 = 0.16
hours.
1 x 1.3 - 1.3
4 x 0.15 = 0.6
8 x 0.033 = 0.26
1 x 0.16 = 0.16
hours.
1 x 1.3 = 1.3
4 x 0.15 = 0.6
8 x 0.033 = 0.26
1 x 0.16 = 0.16
1553 to I/O Device Interface - 6.1 failures/106 hours.
Remote Terminal Interface
Driver/Receiver
Digital/Analog Converter
Analog/Digital Converter
Analog Multiplexer
Track/Hold Amplifier
Connector
1 x 1.3 = 1.3
4 x 0.033 = 0.13
1 x 1.4 = 1.4
1 x 1.8 -- 1.8
1 x 0.4 - 0.4
1 x 0.9 = 0.9
1 x 0.16 -- 0.16
The failure rates of the D/A Converter, A/D Converter, Track/Hold Amplifier, and
the Remote Terminal Interfaces were supplied by a vendor. The rest of the devices' failure
rates were calculated using the MIL-HDBK-217D guidelines.
All of the I/O devices connected to the 1553 bus were assumed to be connected to
the bus via identical "generic" interfaces consisting of the parts listed above. A block
diagram of the interface is shown in Figure 7-8.
Although many factors are involved in estimating failure rates of avionics, we feel
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that we have considered the most dominant ones. Implementing space qualified parts and
controlling the operating environment of the avionics are the two most significant methods
of lowering device failure rates. Throughout our calculations we assumed that space
qualified parts would be used but we incorporated the ERV worst case environment.
1553 Bus
Remote
Terminal
Interface
(RTI)
4---
___ Driver/Receiver(Data Latch)
__ Dr|ver/Recelver(Data Latch)
--_ DIA Converter
D
Figure 7-8. 1553 Interface Block Diagram
7.5 MARKOV MODELS
In order to quantify the reliability analysis of the ERV avionics suite, the failure
modes of the system have been modelled as a series of Markov processes. In a Markov
model of any system, each possible state of the system is identified. The associated state-
transition rates are also determined. States in Markov models are characterized by their lack
of history - the next state is solely dependent upon the current state and, thus, wholly
independent from the previous stateS. Solutions to the probability of being in any state n as
a function of time t, Pn(t), can be found using differential equations or, more conveniently,
standard software programs. Markov models have proven to be an effective means of
analyzing the reliability of systems which undergo failure and repair [Babcock], [Gai et all,
[Schabowsky et all.
One drawback of Markov modelling is that the number of states grows
exponentially with the number of identified components. For systems whose failure modes
can become quite complex, such as the ERV avionics suite - where failures of the Fault-
Tolerant Processor (FTP), 1553 bus system, and ERV-specific critical devices can all cause
system loss - the models easily become unwieldily large.
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The Markov modelling of the ERV avionics suite must account for failures not only
of the triplex core FTP, but for failure modes which involve the attached I/O buses (notably
the triple redundant MIL-STD-1553 buses), and vehicle critical devices such as
aerosurfaces, engines, guidance and navigation sensors, including the interfaces to these
devices. As one soon realizes, the ERV Markov model quickly becomes very large.
To combat this problem, the analysis described in this section has made some
conservative assumptions which reduce the avionics suite model into three simpler models.
These assumptions also allow the analysis to consider the simpler models as independent,
thus making them easier to handle.
The three models considered in the analysis are:
1. A model for the triplex core flight computer (the FTP). This results in a
probability of triplex core loss (PTcD.
2. A model for the 1553 bus I/O system, resulting in a probability of I/O
system loss (PIOL).
3. A model for the devices critical to ERV vehicle success, resulting in a
probability of critical device loss (PcDL).
The probability of vehicle loss (PvL) can be determined as the probability of any of the
above three events occurring, that is,
PVL ffi PTCL t..) PIOL t..) PCDL. (7-1)
This section describes in detail the models which were employed to detemaine PTCL, PIOL,
and PCDL. The results of those models, based upon failure rates determined in the
previous section are discussed in Section 7.6. The actual simulations were run using Mark
1 and SURE, both Markov model solvers. The input source files for these programs are
found in Appendices C and D, respectively.
7.5.1 Probability of Triplex Core Loss (PTCL)
The Markov model which describes the failure characteristics of the ERV triplex
FTP core bases its state transition rates on the following:
• The (hardware) failure rate of each channel's processor (_.p).
• The (hardware) failure rate of each channel's interstage (7,0.
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• The (software) rate for fault identification and reconfiguration (It).
• The second failure coverage (C2) 6.
The model is depicted in Figure 7-9.
The states in the model can be categorized into six classifications, starting with the
healthiest:
• NO FAILURES (S 1 IN THE MODEL)
A fully operative FTP is identified by this state.
• SINGLE UNIDENTIFIED FAILURE ($2 - $7)
Upon the first failure of any channel's processor or interstage, the model
transitions from S 1 to any of $2 - $7, depending upon which hardware fault-
containment region failed. Although the FTP hardware has correctly detected
and masked the failure and thus prevented it from corrupting the system, the
FTP software must isolate the fault and reconfigure the system around it. These
states are the point in time before the FTP Fault Detection, Isolation, and
Reconfiguration (FDIR) software has properly identified the failure. Should a
second failure occur when the system is in any of these states, a catastrophic
failure would occur (loss of system).
• SINGLE FAILURE IDENTIFIED - DUPLEX CONFIGURATION ($8 - S10)
Once FDIR has identified the first failure and reconfigured the system around it
- by effectively taking the entire faulty channel off-line - the system gracefully
degrades into a duplex mode, with only two channels operating correctly.
Duplex operation presents no harmful consequences to the proper control of the
spacecraft.
6C 1 = 100%.
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Figure 7-9. ERV FTP Triplex Core Markov Model
J
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• SECOND UNIDENTIFIED FAILURE (Sll - $22)
A second failure could occur in the system. As in the Single Unidentified
Failure state, the system is in a limbo state until the FDIR properly identifies the
failure or a third failure occurs, causing system loss. While the triplex VI'P
configuration provides 100% coverage for the f'LrSt failure, once the system
degrades into a duplex system, the coverage is lowered. CSDL estimates
coverage for the second failure to be 95%: 90% coverage by the FDIR and a
50/50 chance of correctly guessing for the remaining 10%. Thus, once in S 11 -
$22, the system has a 5% chance of loss of integrity, assuming no other
failures arise.
$25)
• SECOND FAILURE IDENTIFIED - SIMPLEX CONFIGURATION ($23 -
If the system properly recovered from the second failure, it degrades into a
simplex mode with a single channel operative. With no other failures in the
system (bus loss, critical device failure, etc.), a simplex configuration can
control the vehicle. (Should a 1553 bus also fail, vehicle loss is assumed. This
is discussed further in this section.)
• CATASTROPHIC FAILURE - SYSTEM LOSS ($26)
Loss of the FTP system integrity can occur in any of three ways: if a second
failure occurs when the first has not yet been identified ($2- $7); inability of the
system to identify the second failure; the occurrence of three failures (in separate
fault-containment regions).
Figure 7-10 shows the devices that constitute each channel of the FI'P. The
hardware failure rates (3,p and 3.0 were obtained from the work described in Section 7.4.
These rates are tabulated in Figure 7-11. The processor failure rate, 3.p, includes the
processor in the FTP channel along with all of the interfaces on that channel's IOB. As a
basis for the software identification and reconfiguration rate (It), twice the period of the
expected FDIR rate was used. This is a worst-case estimate since a failure could occur just
as the FDIR passes through its fault identification scheme; reconfiguration of that failure
could not occur until the end of the next FDIR execution. In the ERV, FDIR is expected to
be run with the fastest real-time rate group (estimated at 50 Hz, for now). Thus 1/It = 2
(1/50) = 40 ms. As previously mentioned (¶S11 - $22), the second failure coverage, C2,
was set to 95% for these models.
90 Avionics Architecture Studies for the Entry Research Vehicle
AVIONICS RELIABILITY ANALYSIS
Channel A Channel B Channel C
Processor _ Processor_ Processor _
t '131 i I_1 t i_t
lOB II _ [ IOB I1. I IOB II I
I()B _ IOB _ IOB
I
BIU1553 Bus 1
!
1553 Bus 2 1553 Bus 2
i
I I
1553 Bus 3 1553 Bus 3
I
BIU [1553 Bus 1
Figure 7-10. FTP Core
%p for Channel A Xp for Channel B
Processor: 72.6 f./106 hrs
IOB Int.: 1.2 f./106 hrs
Air Data Int.:4.0 f./106 hrs
Skids Int.: 5.4 f./106 hrs
Radar AlL: 4.0 f./106 hrs
1553 #1 Int.:4.6 f./106 hrs
1553 #2 Int.: 4.6 f./106 hrs
Processor: 72.6 f./106
IOB Int.: 1.2 f./106
Air Data Int.: 4.0 f./106
Skids Int.: 5.4 f./106
GSE Int.: 2.3 f./106
Radar AlL: 4.0 f.[106
1553 #2 Int.: 4.6 f./106
1553 #3 Int.: 4.6 f./106
_p for Channel C
hrs Processor: 72.6 f./106 hrs
hrs IOB Int.: 1.2 f./106 hrs
hrs Air Data Int.: 4.0 f./106 hrs
hrs Skids Int.: 5.4 f./106 hrs
hrs GSE Int.: 2.3 f./106 hrs
hrs 1553 #3 Int.: 4.6 f./106 hrs
hrs 1553 #1 Int.: 4.6 f./106 hrs
hrs
Xp = 91.8 failures/106 hrs. Xp = 94.1 failures/106 hrs. Xp = 90.8 failures/106 hrs.
hi = 1.5 failures/106 hrs. (for all channels)
Figure 7.11. Tabulation of 2p and 2i
The Markov model for the FTP failure modes notably excludes repairs. Being an
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unmanned, short-mission vehicle, it would be impossible to repair hard failures in-flight.
This assumption, however, implies that even transient failures - those that cause a channel
to be faulty for a short time and then disappear - are irreparable. Once a failure occurs in
this model, the system degrades to a less redundant process. A complete list of the FTP
model states and transition rates is given in Appendix B.
Vehicle loss due to triplex core loss is not solely based upon the probability of
reaching the catastrophic failure state ($26) in the FTP model. Should the FTP degrade to
simplex mode and lose one of that channel's attached 1553 buses, vehicle loss is also
assumed. The inclusion of the probability of this combination, PS/B (simplex mode/bus
failure), is because the sole controlling channel needs access to both of its 1553 buses for
successful vehicle operation.
If A, B, and C are the probabilities of simplex operation by the respective channel
and a', b', and c' are the failure probabilities of the 1553 buses not attached to the
respective channel, then one sees that,
PS/B = A • (b' + c') +
B • (a' + c')
+ C • (a' + b')
(7-2)
since A, B, and C are mutually exclusive events. PS/B has been conservatively simplified
by assuming that any 1553 bus failure while the FTP is in simplex mode results in vehicle
loss. Thus, PS/B is assumed to be,
PS/B = (A + B + C) • (a' + b' + c') (7-3)
which overestimates the actual value by (A • a') + (B • b') + ( C • c'), but makes the
calculations simpler.
The aggregate model for PTCL is shown below in Figure 7-12. From this model,
one can see that the assumed PTCL is calculated to be
PTCL = PS26 + PS/B, (7-4)
where
PS/B = (Ps23 + PS24 + PS25) • Prob[single 1553 failure], (7-5)
Prob[single 1553 failure] is discussed thoroughly Section 7.5.2.
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in triplex
or duplex
mode
catastrophic failure
simplex loss
Triplex
Core
Loss
Figure 7-12. Aggregate Model for PTCL
7.5.2 PROBABILITY OF SYSTEM BUS FAILURE (PIOL).
The second major area of concern in the reliability model is the 1553 subsystem
which provides the triplex core with its I/O interface. If access to this system is lost,
regardless of the condition of the core, vehicle loss will result. If the failure of the I/O
system is considered independent from Iriplex core failures, the probability of vehicle loss
can be determined by ORing the two probabilities.
I/O system loss has been assumed to include these events:
• loss of two 1553 buses
• loss of one 1553 bus and one interface in a duplex interface to an I/O
device
• loss of one 1553 bus and two interfaces in a triplex interface to an I/O
device
• loss of all interfaces to an I/O device (two/duplex, three/triplex)
In other words,
PIOL = PDBF L.J (PSBF ('_ (PDISF k,.) PTIDF)) k,.J PIF (7-6)
where PIOL is the probability of I/O subsystem (1553) loss,
PDBF is the probability of a double (1553) bus failure,
PSBF is the probability of a single (1553) bus failure,
PI)ISF is the probability of duplex interface single failure,
P't_F is the probability of triplex interface double failure, and
PIF is the probability of an entire interface failure.
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Each of the three OR terms [PDBF, PSBF" (PDISF k.) PTIDF), and PIF] are described in the
following sections.
7.5.2.1 PROBABILITY OF A DOUBLE BUS FAILURE (PDBF)
The probability of losing two 1553 buses can be modelled by the process shown in
Figure 7-13.
OK 1F 2F
Figure 7.13. Probability of Double (1553) Bus Failure (PDBF)
The process starts in State 0 (So) with three operational 1553 buses. It transitions
to St (a single bus failure) at a rate of 3_.B, where XB is the failure rate for one 1553 bus.
After one bus has been lost, the model transitions to $2 (double bus failure), now at a rate
of 27LB, since one bus has already failed.
The calculation of LB was determined by making the following assumptions:
• Only hardware directly interfacing to a bus can fail the bus. This
includes the channel Bus Interface Units (BIUs) and the device
interfaces' Remote Terminal Interfaces (RTIs) and driver/receiver (D/R)
pairs. See Figure 7-9.
• Only 10% of the failures of that hardware are active (not passive)
failures and result in the loss of the bus.
The failure rate, _,B, is thus calculated as,
XB = 0.10 • ((_,RTI + _-D/R) "n + 2XBIU) (7-7)
where _-RTI is the failure rate of the Remote Terminal Interface,
XD/R is the failure rate of the driver/receiver pairs,
n is the number of 1553 devices on the bus, and
_.BIU is the failure rate of the channel's 1553 Bus Interface Unit.
at,
From Section 7.4, _.B is calculated as
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_,B = 0.I0 • ((1.3 + 0.13) • 7 + 2(1.2)) failures/106 hours
= 1.241 x 10 -6 failures/hour,
and using the simple model of Figure 7-13, both PSBF and PDBF are easily determined.
7.5.2.2 PROBABILITY OF SINGLE BUS AND PARTIAL I/O DEVICE INTERFACE
FAILURES
The 1553 I/O system can also be considered failed if a single bus is lost and the
interfaces to the same device on the non-failed buses are lost. For example, if 1553 B1
fails and the RCS interfaces on B2 and B3 also fail, the system would be considered failed
since no interface to the RCS jets would be available. This is given by the quantity
PSBF _ (PDISF LD PTIDF) (7-8)
in (7-6).
This condition is simplified if one disregards which bus has failed. Similar to the
discussion in Section 7.5.1 for determining PS/B, this failure mode is assumed if a single
bus fails and any majority of an I/O device interface (one/duplex, two/triplex) fails. If there
are n duplex interfaces and m triplex interfaces, the above quantity becomes equal to
PSBF
¢"h
(Prob[at least one of n duplex interfaces incurred a single failure]
q.)
Prob[at least one of m triplex interfaces incurred two failures]).
Since PSBF has been determined (Section 7.2.1), the latter two terms in (7-8), now
described by the above quantities, need only be determined. Before arriving at the
formulas for these probabilities, some discussion is necessary to further clarify the model.
Suppose the ERV has n I/O devices which have duplex interfaces. The failure
model for one of these interfaces is described by Figure 7-14. In the model, _. is the failure
rate of the device interface (_, = 6.1 failures/106 hours from Section 7.4).
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OK 1F 2F
Figure 7-14. Simple Markov Model for Failure of a Duplex Device Interface
Let P0 = Prob[S0 at time t], P1 = Prob[St at time t], and P2 = Prob[S2 at time t],
where t is some specified value. For n devices at time t, the probability that all are OK -
that is, in SO - is (P0) n, since these are all independent events. Likewise, the probability
that at least one of n has failed is 1 - (P0) n. Also note that the probability that all have failed
(none in SO) is (1 - P0) n. These probabilities are more clearly seen if the event space is
drawn out for the process of n events (Figure 7-15).
Prob[aii in SO] |_:@_iii_:_!_i_i_ii_i!iB_i_!_|
:i::'_::" ":: ::::: : _::_: :: :::::.'.'::::i.'.'_
__!iiiiiii_i_i",,.:/_ii_iiiii::i_i_igI Prob[none m SOl
:::::::::::::::::::::::::::::: A
Prob[at least 1 in SO] !__/!_;_._.',_<_;?:>_! = (1-PO) n
= (1 - (1 - P_ _,F_!___. 'm_'_;""_:_ilili_._._::_!i:$_::%_!:::"__:_:_:_:%::_: ;i::":i:i_:::_i_i_
'_:._;:_ _;_.2.:_::...
Figure 7-15. Event Space for n Duplex Device Interfaces
For this section, we are concerned with P1 over n events. Specifically, the
probability that at least 1 of n events resulted in S 1 (and not $2) needs to be determined.
Using simile reasoning as the above paragraph and figures, the probability that none of n
events have resulted in S1 is (1 -P1) n. The probability that at least one of the n events is
in S1 is merely the complement of this quantity, i.e., 1 - (1 - P1) n.
For ERV I/O devices with triplex interfaces (assume m of these) the model becomes
slightly more complex, although the analysis is similar. These interfaces are modelled by
the illustration in Figure 7-16. The process starts in $3 with no failures. At a rate of 3_. (_.
= 6.1 failures/10 6 hours, again from Section 7.4), the interface decays to a duplex
configuration. A second failure occurs at a rate of 2X and the device is then operated by a
simplex interface ($5). At a rate of X, a third failure occurs and the device is lost.
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OK 1F 2F 3F
Figure 7-16. Simple Markov Model for Failure of a Triplex Device Interface
Again letting Px = Prob[Sx at time t], we are interested in P5 over m events, or
more specifically, the probability that at least 1 of m devices resulted in $5. Following the
same reasoning which was used for duplex interfaces, this quantity is 1 - (1 - PS) m.
The union of these probabilities for failures with duplex and triplex interfaces is
easily determined using A u B = A + B - A.B, since these events are not mutually
exclusive.
In summary then, the probability of a single bus failure and a failure of an I/(3
device can be assumed to be
PSBF n (PDISF W PTIDF) = PSBF n ((1 - (1- P1) n) u (1 - (1- P5)m)), (7-9)
where P1 and P5 axe given by the models in Figures 7-14 and 7-16, respectively, and n and
m are the number of !/O devices with duplex and triplex interfaces, respectively.
7.5.2.3 PROBABILITY OF INTERFACE FAmURE (Pn:)
An entire interface failure (two/duplex, three/triplex) is also a possible failure mode
for PIOL. Conveniently, this probability has been determined in the previous section. In
the models of Figures 7-11 and 7-13, entire interface failures are represented by $2 and $6.
The probability either of these events occurring is merely the union of P2 and P6 (This
must be done using A _ B = A + B - A-B, since these events are also not mutually
exclusive.)
7.5.2.4 COMBINING THE RESULTS TO OBTAIN THE PROBABILITY OF I/O LOSS (PIOL)
The previous sections have discussed each of the three terms found in (7-6) which
contribute to PIOL, namely,
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PIOL = PDBF
U (PSBF (3 (PDISF k._ PTIDF))
u PIF (7-6)
To determine the exact formula for PIOL, careful attention must be paid to the event space in
question. Figure 7-17 diagrams the event space for PIOL loss. From the figure and the
above equation (7-6), we can determine the probabilities in terms of the proper AND and
OR functions. Alternatively, we can use the fact that
AuBuC=A+B+C
-A*B-A*C-B-C
+A.B.C, (7-1o)
letting PDBF = A, PIF = C, and PSBF _ (PDISF U PTIDF) equal the single term B. The
event space diagram can be used to simplify the resulting PIOL by removing zero terms (the
fact that SBF and DBF are mutually exclusive events, etc).
Figure 7.17. Event Space for PIOL
The gray areas of the figure are those which add to PIOL. By inspection of the
figure, one can see the overlapping events (darker gray) and deduce the following:
PIOL = PDBF + PSBF ° (PDISF U PT1DF) + PIF
- PDBF" PIF - PSBF * (PDISF U PTIDF) * PIF (7-11)
Equation (7-11) can also be derived by using (7-10) with A = PDBF, B = PSBF"
(PDISF k) PTIDF), and C = Pn_. We see that
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PIOL = PDBF
+ PSBF" (PDISF U PTIDF)
+ PIF
PDBF" PSBF * (PDISF U PTIDF)
PDBF" PIF
- PSBF" (PDISF U PTIDF) " PIF
+ PDBF" PSBF" (PDISF U PTIDF) " PIF
Since all PDBF * PSBF terms are zero, (%12) reduces to
PIOL = PDBF
+ PSBF" (PDISF U PTIDF)
+ PIF
-
-PDBF'PIF
PSBF'(PDISF U PTIDF)'PIF
+
PIOL = PDBF
+ PSBF" (PDISF U PTIDF)
+ PIF
- PDBF'PIF
-PSBF'(PDISF U PTIDF)*PIF
which isthe same as (7-II).
In summary, the probability that the I/O system fails (PIoL) is given by
PIOL = PDBF + PSBF" (PDISF L.JPTIDF) + PIF
PDBF'PIF PSBF'(PDISF L: PTIDF)'PIF
where
PDISF L.JlXrlDF =
((1 (1 P1) n)+(1 (1 PS)m)) ((1 (1 P1)n) .(1-(1 P5)m))
and where Pl and P5 are described by the models in Section 7.5.2.2.
(7-12)
7.5.3 PROBABILITY OF CRITICAL DEVICE LOSS (PCDL)
This analysishas alsoaccounted forfailuresof I/O devicescriticalto ERV vehicle
success. These include aerosurfaces,propulsion jets,and G/N devices. Duc to the
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preliminary stage of this analysis, however, each of these components could not be
addressed directly. Instead, it has been assumed that the devices have a combined
probability of failure of 10 -7 after 10 hours. (This number has been determined by
assuming each device has a failure rate of 10-9 failures/hour. There are approximately 10
such devices.) For future analysis, this number is easily altered.
In the model, PCDL is easily unioned with PTCL and PIOL to obtain PVL.
7.6 MARKOV RESULTS
Both SURE and Mark 1 model solvers were used to determine the state
probabilities described in Section 7.5. The results for an 8-hour mission are tallied below.
7.6.1 PROBABILITY OF VEHICLE LOSS
Prob {Triplex Core Loss }
Prob{I/O System Loss}
Prob {Interface Failure}
Prob{Double Interface Single Failure
or Triplex Interface Double Failure}
Prob{ Single Bus Failure}
Prob {Double Bus Failure }
Prob{ Simplex Processor Only }
Prob {Critical Device Loss }
Prob{Vehicle Loss}
PTCL = 8.42 x 10 -8
PIOL = 1.23 x 10 -8
PIF = 2.33 x 10 "9
PDISF u PTIDF = 6.83 x 10 -4
PSBF = 1.44 x 10 -5
PDBF- 6.91 x 10 -11
PSIMP = 2.09 x 10 "5
PCDL = 8.0 x 10 -8
PVL=1.77 x 10 -7
Figures 7-18, 7-19, and 7-20 illustrate the probability characteristics over time. Set
to the same scale, the figures show PTCL, PIOL, and PVL, respectively, from t = 0.1 hours
to 10,000 hours.
While Figures 7-18 and 7-19 resemble expected probability curves, Figure 7-20 has
an interesting slope character. From Section 7.5 one can recall that
PVL = PTCL _J PIOL U PCDL
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where PCDL is the probability of a critical device loss. In Section 7.5.3 it was noted that
XCDL = 10 -9 failures/hour. Thus, PCDL should be a linear function of time. At the start of
the mission, where PTCL and PIOL are significantly less than 10 "9, PCDL is the dominant
term in PVL. As the mission progresses, PCDL becomes less dominant and PTCL and PIOL
rule PVL. Thus, as one can see in the figure, PVL has an interesting twist between early
mission times and later ones.
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Figure 7-18. Probability of Triplex Core Loss
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Figure 7-19. Probability of I/0 System Loss
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Figure 7-20. Probability of Vehicle Loss
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7.6.2 SENSITIVITY OF VEHICLE LOSS TO VARIATION OF TRANSITION
RATES
In addition to the nominal numbers given above, sensitivity analyses were
performed. Sensitivities of the models to processor failure rate (Z.p), second failure
coverage (C2), 1553 Bus failure rate (_,B), and device interface failure rate were run. The
results axe given below.
Processor Failure Rate (_.p)
PTCL = 3.33 x 10 -7
PIOL = 1.23 x 10 -8
PVL = 4.25 x 10 -7
2.17 x 10 -8
1.23 x 10 -8
1.14 x 10 -7
Second Failure Coverage (C2)
90%
PTCL- 1.68 x 10 -7
PIOL = 1.23 x 10 -8
PVL = 2.60x 10 -7
85%
3.32 x 10 -6
1.23 x 10 -8
3.44 x 10 -7
Bus Failure Rate (3.B)
2x Nominal
PTCL = 8.42 x 10 -8
P/OL = 2.23 x 10 -8
PVL = 1.87 x 10 -7
112 Nominal
8.42 x 10 -8
7.32 x 10 -9
1.72 x 10 -7
Device Interface Failure Rate
PTCL- 8.42 x I0 -8 8.42 x I0 -8
PIOL--- 2.93 x 10 -8 5.48 x 10 -9
PVL = 1.93 x 10 -7 1.70 x 10 -7
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The sensitivity analyses show that the effect of processor failure rate and the second
failure coverage are the dominant factors in determining PVL. Changing the bus failure rate
and the device interface failure rate by a factor of two resulted in only a 10 percent change
in PVL. However, similar changes in processor failure rate and second failure coverage
yielded a 50 to 240 percent change in PVL. The processor failure rate and second failure
coverage contribute solely to the probability of triplex core loss (PTCL) indicating that PTCL
dominates over PIOL and PCDL in determining PVL.
7.6.3 IMPROVING ERV RELIABILITY
There are many ways of improving system reliability (i.e., decreasing PVL). Since
ERV avionics are still the design phase, three major suggestions for reaching this goal are
given below.
1 Utilize a quadruplex core processor. A quad-redundant processor would
improve second failure coverage to 100%, and give 95% coverage of
third failures. This should increase the reliability of the processing core
by 1-2 orders of magnitude.
, Decrease the failure rate of a processor channel. This can easily be
accomplished by decreasing on-board memory or by using SECDED
(Single Error Correction, Double Error Detection) memory since
memory failures comprise 85% of a processor channel's failure rate.
, Decrease the failure rate of I/O device interfaces. This could be
accomplished by simplifying the interfaces, or by building redundancy
into the device interfaces themselves.
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8.0 CONCLUSIONS
This report has presented some of the important research contributions which, over
the past twelve months, have resulted in the preliminary design and analysis of the avionic
suite for an Entry Research Vehicle. The vehicle electronics could now enter the
implementation stages of detailed design, prototyping, and flight-qualified fabrication and
integration.
The strawman architecture which grew out of the initial task assignment Was furthei'-
refined as more detailed specifications of the flight hardware and software were examined.
While it was apparent from the onset of this program that the criticality of the mission
would require a digital flight computer which could tolerate internal failures, the degree and
implementation of redundancy in that computer was not entirely obvious. The architecture
chosen was the Fault-Tolerant Processor because of its resiliency to malicious failures with
100% coverage. (Failure coverage below 100% was shown to be inadequate for this
vehicle.) A doubly-redundant architecture could not meet the reliability requirements.
However, quadruplex redundancy in the design provided an overabundance of hardware
for the stated goals. Triplex hardware was found to be sufficient.
Coupled to the core fault-tolerant flight computer are a set of replicated MIL-STD-
1553 buses, each with mixed redundancy I/O devices. The interface between the central
processors and the distributed network of I/O was carefully designed to avoid failure
correlation between the two subsystems. Furthermore, the devices attached to the buses
are not all fully replicated: analytical redundancy among dissimilar sensors and actuators
was exploited to reduce the amount of hardware onboard the vehicle without compromising
reliability.
An outline of the requirements of the bus structures for all of the avionics was also
drawn. Included in this analysis was the design of typical interface units at the three major
levels of the system: intrachannel, interchannel, and input/ouput.
In addition to these architectural issues, design details of the flight electronics were
examined. A study of microprocessors illustrated problems with entrusting design
decisions to performance benchmark statistics alone. For the central processing unit,
characteristics such as power consumption, chip size, memory and I/O management
capabilities, device reliability, software support, and short-term risks were compared to
make a credible selection. To establish hardware viability, a mechanical analysis was
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performed which suggested packaging, cooling, environmental, and other physical
requirements. A scheme presented in NASA Technical Brief 71-10088 was proposed as
the principle cooling method for the electronics.
A reliability analysis was perfomed for the candidate architecture using Markov
modelling techniques. To simplify the analysis, conservative assumptions were made
which divided the avionics suite for evaluation as three separate entities. Rigorous
probabalistic methods were employed to combine the independent analyses. Assumptions
which were made in the process proved to be significant only for evaluations performed for
flight durations greater than 10 4 hours. Since ERV missions are expected to be on the
order of 10 hours, the results - showing that the architecture meets the desired probability
of mission failure of 10 -6 - can be credibly accepted.
A viable candidate architecture for the Entry Research Vehicle has been presented.
The underlying principles of this architecture represent a foundation that may be applicable
to other advanced space transportation systems. Shuttle II, the National Aerospace Plane,
Heavy Lift Vehicles, and other advanced space vehicles which require ultra-reliable high-
performance control in real time can make use of the developments of this task assignment.
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The following are the states defined in the Markov model of the ERV Fault-Tolerant
Processor. The model is depicted in Figure 7-9.
S 1 No Failures
$2 Processor A Failure
$3 Interstage A Failure
$4 Processor B Failure
$5 Interstage B Failure
$6 Processor C Failure
$7 Interstage C Failure
$8 BC Duplex, A Off-line
$9 AC Duplex, B Off-line
S 10 AB Duplex, C Off-line
S 11 BC Duplex, Processor B Failure
S 12 BC Duplex, Interstage B Failure
S 13 BC Duplex, Processor C Failure
S14 BC Duplex, Interstage C Failure
S 15 AC Duplex, Processor A Failure
S 16 AC Duplex, Interstage A Failure
S17 AC Duplex, Processor C Failure
S 18 AC Duplex, Interstage C Failure
S 19 AB Duplex, Processor A Failure
$20 AB Duplex, Interstage A Failure
$21 AB Duplex, Processor B Failure
$22 AB Duplex, Interstage B Failure
$23 A Simplex, BC Offline
$24 B Simplex, AC Offline
$25 C Simplex, AB Offline
$26 Fail Catastrophic
The basis for the state transition rates are given by the following 5 terms:
L1=91.8 x 10 -6 failures/hour Failure Rate of Channel A Processor (_-pa)
L2=94.1 x 10 -6 failures/hour Failure Rate of Channel B Processor (kpb)
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L3=90.1 x 10 -6 failures/hour
L4=1.5 x 10 -6 failures/hour
L5=9.0 x 10 +4 IDs/hour
Failure Rate of Channel C Processor (Tq_c)
Failure Rate of Any Interstage (3.0
Software Fault Identification and
Re,configuration Rate _)
The following are the state transition rates that were used in the Markov model for
the ERV FTP triplex Core.
TRANSITION RATE
1-->2 L1
1--->3 L4
I--->4 L2
1--->5 L4
1--->6 L3
1-_7 L4
2--->8 L5
3_8 L5
4--->9 L5
5_9 L5
6--->10 L5
7---_10 L5
2--->26 L2+L3+3*L4
3--->26 L1+L2+L3+2*L4
4--->26 Ll+L3+3*L4
5--->26 Ll+L2+L3+2*L4
6--->26 L 1+L2+3*LA
7_26 Ll+L2+L3+2*L4
DESCRIPTION
Processor A Fails
Interstage A Fails
Processor B Fails
Interstage B Fails
Processor C Fails
Interstage C Fails
System Reconfigures to BC Duplex
System Reconfigures
System Reconfigures
System Reconfigures
System Reconfigures
to BC Duplex
to AC Duplex
to AC Duplex
to AB Duplex
System Reconfigures to AB Duplex
Second Failure While Reeonfigurmg -
System Loss
Second Failure While Reconfigunng -
System Loss
Second Failure While Reconfigurmg -
System Loss
Second Failure While Reconfigurmg -
System Loss
Second Failure While Reconfigurmg -
System Loss
Second Failure While Reconfigurmg -
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System Loss
8-4 11 1.,2 Duplex BC, Processor B Fails
8-412 IA Duplex BC, Interstage B Fails
8-413 L3 Duplex BC, Processor C Fails
8-414 I_.4 Duplex BC, Interstage C Fails
9-415 LI Duplex AC, Processor A Fails
9-416 LA Duplex AC, Interstage A Fails
9-417 L3 Duplex AC, Processor C Fails
9-4 18 IA Duplex AC, Interstage C Fails
10-419 L1 Duplex AB, Processor A Fails
10-420 IA Duplex AB, Interstage A Fails
10-421 L2 Duplex AB, Processor B Fails
10-422 L4 Duplex AB, Interstage B Fails
11-425 0.95"L5 System Recomfgures to Simplex C
12--_25 0.95"L5 System Reconfigures to Simplex C
13-424 0.95"L5 System Reconfigures to Simplex B
14-424 0.95"L5 System Reconfigures to Simplex B
15-425 0.95"L5 System Reconfigures to Simplex C
16-425 0.95"L5 System Reconfigures to Simplex C
17-423 0.95"L5 System Reconfigures to Simplex A
18-423 0.95"L5 System Reconfigures to Simplex A
19-424 0.95"L5 System Reconfigures to Simplex B
20-424 0.95"L5 System Reconfigures to Simplex B
21-423 0.95"L5 System Reconfigures to Simplex A
22-423 0.95"L5 System Reconfigures to Simplex A
11-426 L3+2*L4+.05*L5 3rd Failure or Unable to Downgrade
12-426 L2+L3+L4+.05*L5 3rd Failure or Unable to Downgrade
13-426 L2+2*L4+.05*L5 3rd Failure or Unable to Downgrade
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14--,26
15--,26
16--,26
17--,26
18--,26
19_26
20_26
21_26
22_26
23_26
24_26
25---¢26
L2+L3+L4+.05*L5
L3+2*L4+.05*L5
Ll+L3+L4+.05*L5
Ll+2*IA+.05*L5
Ll+L3+L4+.05*L5
L2+2*LA+.05*L5
Ll+L2+L4+.05*L5
Ll+2*IA+.05*L5
Ll+L2+L4+.05*L5
L1
L2
L3
3rd Failure
3rd Failure
3rd Failure
3rd Failure
3rd Failure
3rd Failure
3rd Failure
3rd Failure
3rd Failure
Simplex A,
Simplex B,
Simplex C,
or Unable to
or Unable to
or Unable to
or Unable to
or Unable to
or Unable to
or Unable to
Downgrade
Downgrade
Downgrade
Downgrade
Downgrade
Downgrade
Downgrade
or Unable to Downgrade
or Unable to Downgrade
Processor A Fails
Processor B Fails
Processor C Fails
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The following is the source code for the reliability evaluation of the ERV flight
computer using the Mark 1 Markov modeling package:
TITLE--ERV RMA MODEL - BASELINE EXACT (ERV21D) 5/18/87
M1 =26--TRIPLEX WITH INTER-STAGES
$1 =1 --NOTAILURES
S2=0-PROCESSOR A FAILURE
S3=0--INTERSTAGE A FAILURE
S4=0--PROCESSOR B FAILURE
SS=0--INTERSTAGE B FAILURE
S6=0--PROCESSOR C FAILURE
S7=0--INTERSTAGE C FAILURE
S8=0--BC DUPLEX, A OFFLINE
S0=0--AC DUPLEX, B OFFLINE
S10=0--AB DUPLEX, C OFFLINE
$11 ---0--BC DUPLEX, PROCESSOR B FAILURE
S12=0--BC DUPLEX, INTERSTAGE B FAILURE
S13=0--BC DUPLEX, PROCESSOR C FAILURE
$14=0-BC DUPLEX, INTERSTAGE C FAILURE
$15=0--AC DUPLEX, PROCESSOR A FAILURE
$16=0--AC DUPLEX, INTERSTAGE A FAILURE
$17---0--AC DUPLEX, PROCESSOR C FAILURE
S18=0..-AC DUPLEX, INTERSTAGE C FAILURE
$19=0--AB DUPLEX, PROCESSOR A FAILURE
S20=0--AB DUPLEX, INTERSTAGE A FAILURE
S21=0---AB DUPLEX, PROCESSOR B FAILURE
S22=0--AB DUPLEX, INTERSTAGE B FAILURE
$23=0--A SIMPLEX, BC OFFLINE
$24=0--B SIMPLEX, AC OFFLINE
$25=0--C SIMPLEX, AB OFFLINE
S26=0--FAIL CATASTROPHIC
L1 =91.8E-6--FAILURE RATE OF PROC A
L2=94.1E-6--FAILURE RATE OF PROC B
L3=90.1E-6--FAILURE RATE OF PROC C
L4=I.5E-6--FAILURE RATE OF INTER-STAGE "
L5=0.0E+4--RECOVERY RATE
L6=.95--PERCENTAGE OF TIME 2ND FAILURE IS RECOVERABLE
T1 >2=L1--PROCESSOR A FAILS
TI>3=L4--INTERSTAGE A FAILS
T1 >4=L2.--PROCESSOR B FAILS
TI>5=L4--INTERSTAGE B FAILS
TI>6=L3--PROCESSOR C FAILS
TI>7=L4--INTERSTAGE C FAILS
T2>8=L5-SYSTEM RECONFIGURES TO BC DUPLEX
T3>8=L5-SYSTEM RECONFIGURES TO BC DUPLEX
T4>9=LS--SYSTEM RECONFIGURES TO AC DUPLEX
T5>g=LS--SYSTEM RECONFIGURES TO AC DUPLEX
T6>10=L5-SYSTEM RECONFIGURES TO AB DUPLEX
1"7>10=L5--SYSTEM RECONFIGURES TO AB DUPLEX
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T2>26=L2+L3+3*L4--SECOND FAILURE WHILE RECONFIGURING - SYSTEM LOSS
T3>26=L1 +L2+L3+2*L4--SECOND FAILURE WHILE RECONFIGURING - SYSTEM LOSS
T4>26=L1 +L3+3*L4--SECOND FAILURE WHILE RECONFIGURING - SYSTEM LOSS
T5>26=L1 +L2+L3+2*L4--SECOND FAILURE WHILE RECONFIGURING - SYSTEM LOSS
T6>26=L1 +L2+3°L4--SECOND FAILURE WHILE RECONFIGURING - SYSTEM LOSS
T7>26=L1 +L2+L3+2*L4--SECOND FAILURE WHILE RECONFIGURING - SYSTEM LOSS
T8>11 =L2-DUPLEX BC, PROCESSOR B FAILS
T8>12=L4--DUPLEX BC, INTERSTAGE B FAILS
T8>13=L3--DUPLEX BC, PROCESSOR C FAILS
T8>14=L4--DUPLEX BC, INTERSTAGE C FAILS
T9>15--L1--DUPLEX AC, PROCESSOR A FAILS
T9>16--L4--DUPLEX AC, INTERSTAGE A FAILS
T9>17=L3--DUPLEX AC, PROCESSOR C FAILS
Tg>18=L4--DUPLEX AC, INTERSTAGE C FAILS
T10>19--L1--DUPLEX AB, PROCESSOR A FAILS
T10>20=L4--DUPLEX AB, INTERSTAGE A FAILS
T10>21 =L2--DUPLEX AB, PROCESSOR B FAILS
T10>22=L4--DUPLEX AB, INTERSTAGE B FAILS
T11 >25=L6*L5--SYSTEM RECONFIGURES TO SIMPLEX C
T12>25=L6*L5--SYSTEM RECONFIGURES TO SIMPLEX C
T13>24=L6*L5--SYSTEM RECONFIGURES TO SIMPLEX B
T14>24=L6*L5--SYSTEM RECONFIGURES TO SIMPLEX B
T15>25=L6*L5--SYSTEM RECONFIGURES TO SIMPLEX C
T16>25=L6*L5--SYSTEM RECONFIGURES TO SIMPLEX C
T17>23=L6*L5--SYSTEM RECONFIGURES TO SIMPLEX A
T18>23=L6*L5-°SYSTEM RECONFIGURES TO SIMPLEX A
T19>24=L6*L5--SYSTEM RECONFIGURES TO SIMPLEX B
T20>24=L6*L5--SYSTEM RECONFIGURES TO SIMPLEX B
T21 >23=L6*L5--SYSTEM RECONFIGURES TO SIMPLEX A
T22>23=L6*I_5--SYSTEM RECONFIGURES TO SIMPLEX A
T1 l>26=L3+2*L4+(1-L6)*L5--3RD FAILURE OR UNABLE TO DOWNGRADE
T12>26=L2+L3+L4+(1-L6)*L5--3RD FAILURE OR UNABLE TO DOWNGRADE
T13>26=L2+2*L4+(1-L6)*LS--3RD FAILURE OR UNABLE TO DOWNGRADE
T14>26=L2+L3+L4+(1-L6)*L5.-3RD FAILURE OR UNABLE TO DOWNGRADE
T15>26=L3+2"L4+(1-L6)*L5--3RD FAILURE OR UNABLE TO DOWNGRADE
T16>26=L1+L3+L4+(1-L6)*L5--3RD FAILURE OR UNABLE TO DOWNGRADE
T17>26=L1 +2*L4+(1-L6)*L5--3RD FAILURE OR UNABLE TO DOWNGRADE
T18>26=L1 +L3+L4+(1 -L6)*L5--3RD FAILURE OR UNABLE TO DOWNGRADE
T19>26=i..2+2*L4+(1-L6)*L5--3RD FAILURE OR UNABLE TO DOWNGRADE
T20>26=L1+L2+L4+(1-L6)*L5--3RD FAILURE OR UNABLE TO DOWNGRADE
T21>26=L1+2*L4+(1-L6)*L5--3RD FAILURE OR UNABLE TO DOWNGRADE
T22>26=Ll+L2+L4+(1-L6)*LS--3RD FAILURE OR UNABLE TO DOWNGRADE
T23>26=L1--SIMPLEX A, PROCESSOR A FAILS
T24>26=L2--SIMPLEX B, PROCESSOR B FAILS
T25>26=L3--SIMPLEX C, PROCESSOR C FAILS
M2--3--THIS MODEL IS FOR WHOLE BUS FAILURES
$1 =1 --XX
S2=0--XX
S3=0--XX
L1=0.6E-6--FAILURE RATE OF BUS CONTROLLER
TI>2=3*L1--ONE BUS FAILS
T2>3=2*L1--SECOND BUS FAILS - BUSS SYSTEM LOSS
M3--.3--THIS MODEL IS FOR DUPLEX DEVICE INTERFACES
$1 =1 --XX
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S2=0--XX
S3=0--XX
L1=6,1E-6--FAILURE RATE OF DEVICE INTERFACE
TI>2=2*L1--ONE DEVICE FAILS
T2>3=L1--SECOND DEVICE FALLS - DEVICE LOSS
M4=4--THIS MODEL IS FOR TRIPLEX DEVICE INTERFACES
$1 =1 --XX
S2=0--XX
S3=0--XX
S4=0--XX
L1=6,1 E-6--FAILURE RATE OF DEVICE INTERFACE
TI>2=3*L1--ONE DEVICE FAILS
T2>3=2*L1--SECOND DEVICE FAILS
T3>4=L1--TRIPLEX DEVICE LOSS
M5=2-THIS MODEL IS FOR TRIPLEX DEVICE INTERFACES
$1 =1 --XX
S2=0--XX
L1 =1E-g--FAILURE RATE OF ANOTHER CRITICAL DEVICE
T1 >2=10*L1--ONE CRITICAL DEVICE FAILS
RUN 0 1E5
YMIN=-14
FI=S1.26--PROB(S26) - TRIPLEX ATTRITION LOSS
F2=S3.3+S4.4-S3.3*S4.4--PIF
F3=I-S3.2--THIS IS (1-PI)
F4=I-S4.3--THIS IS (1-P5)
F5=I-(F3*F3*F3*F3*F3*F3*F3)--THIS IS 1-(1-P1)^N
F6=I-(F4*F4*F4*F4*F4*F4)--THIS IS 1-(1-P5)AM
F7=F5+F6-F5*F6--THIS IS PDISF UNION PTIDF
F8=S2.2--THIS IS PSBF
Fg=S2.3--THIS IS PDBF
F10=Fg+F8*F7+F2-Fg*F2-F8*F7*F2--THIS IS PIOL
F11 =($1.23+S 1.24+$1.25)*F8--PS/B
F12=F1 I+FI--PTCL
F13=F10+F12-F10*F12--PVCL=PTCL UNION PIOL
F14=S5.2_--THIS IS PCDL
F15=F13+F14-F13*F14--PVL=PVCL UNION PCDL
PLOT F12--PROBABILITY OF TRIPLEX CORE LOSS (PTCL)
PLOT
PLOT
PLOT
PLOT
PLOT
PLOT
PLOT
PLOT
PLOT
END
F10--PROBABILITY OF I/O LOSS (PIOL)
F15-PROBABILITY OF VEHICLE LOSS
F2--PIF
F7--PDISF U PTIDF
FS--PSBF
Fg--PDBF
F11--PROB(LOSS IN SIMPLEX MODE)
F13--PROB(VEHICLE CONTROL LOSS)
F14--PCDL
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So that the reliability of the ERV could be determined as accurately as possible, the
Markov models for this system were evaluated by both the MARK 1 and SURE Reliability
Analysis programs. The results of both programs were virtually identical; the few
differences in output can be attributed to roundoff errors.
The following is the input file for the SURE program and the results obtained using
the it.
D.1 SURE INPUT FILE
We utilized one input file to run SURE: it contains the model describing the
probability of an FTP core loss due strictly to an FTP failure (the probability of being in
State 26 of the model described in Section 7.). Because of the complexity of the true FTP
core loss model, SURE could not be used to calculate the real probability of the FTP core
loss which includes the probability of the FTP operating in simplex with a double bus
failure.
(**i*****'*******Fle:FTPCORE.MOD .... * ....... * .......... * ..................... )(* ")
(* Author:John Esielionis
(* Facility: The Charles Stark Draper Laboratory
(* Created: 01/20/87
(* Last Mod: 04/04/87
(* Purpose: This file contains the model describing the
(*probability of an FTP core loss.
( t** *_ _ t t _* t vt t.*4rll, o****o_ ft*o t _**t t t** _*t _**t**Q*** t* _ t*** * ****
L1 = gl,8E-6; (* Failure rate of Processor A
L2 = g4.1E-6;
L3 = gO.8E-6;
L4 = 1.5E-6;
L5 = 9.0E+4;
L6 = .95;
1,2=L1;
1,3= L4;
1,4=1_2;
1, 5=L4;
1, 6= L3;
1, 7 = L4;
2, 8 = L5;
3, 8 = L5;
4, 9 = L5;
5, 9 = L5;
6, 10 = L5;
(* Failure rate of Processor B
(* Failure rate of Processor C
(* Failure rate of Interstage
(* Recovery rate of Interstage
(* Percent of time 2nd fail is recoverable
(* Processor A fails
(* Interstage
(* Processor
(* Interstage
(* Processor
(* Interstage
(* System reconfigures to BC
(* System reconfigures to BC
(* System reconfigures to AC
(* System reconfigures to AC
(* System reconfigures to AB
A fails
B fails
B fails
C fails
C fails
duplex
duplex
duplex
duplex
duplex
*)
*)
*)
*)
")
*)
)
")
-)
-)
*)
*)
*)
*)
*)
*)
*)
*)
*)
")
*)
")
*)
*)
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7, 10= L5;
2, 26 = L2 + L3 + 3"L4;(
3, 26 = L1 + 1_2 + L3 + 2"L4;
4, 26 = L1 + L3 + 3"L4;
5, 26 = L1 + 1_2 + L3 + 2"L4;
6, 26 = L1 + 1_2 + 3"L4;
7, 26 =,,L1 + 1_2 + L3 + 2"L4;
8,11 =L2;
8, 12 = L4;
8, 13 = L3;
8, 14 = L4;
9, 15 = L1;
9, 16 = L4;
9, 17 = L3;
9, 18 = L4;
10, 19 = L1;
10, 20 = L4;
10, 21 = L2;
10, 22 = L4;
11, 25 = L6* L5;
12, 25 = L6 * L5;
13, 24 = L6 * LS;
14, 24 = L6 " L5;
15, 25 = L6 * L5;
16, 25 = L6 * I_5;
17, 23 = L6 * L5;
18, 23 = L6 * L5;
19, 24 = L6 * L5;
20, 24 = L6 * L5;
21, 23 = L6 * L5;
22, 23 = L6 * L5;
11, 26 = L3 + 2"L4 + (1-L6)*L5;
12, 26 = L2 + L3 + L4 + (1-L6)*LS;
13, 28 = L2 + 2"L4 + (1-L6)*L5;
14, 26 = 1_2 + L3 + L4 + (1-L6)*L5;
15, 26 = L3 + 2"L4 + (1-L6)*LS;
16, 26 = Lt + L3 + L4 + (1-L6)*L5;
17, 26 = L1 + 2"L4 + (1-L6)*L5;
18, 26 = L1 + L3 + L4 + (1-L6)*L5;
19, 26 = L2 + 2"L4 + (1-L6)*LS;
20, 26 = L1 + L2 + L4 + (1-L6)*L5;
2t, 26 - L1 + 2"L4 + (l-L6)*L5;
22, 26 = L1 + 1.2 + L4 + (1-L6)*L5;
23, 26 = L1;
24, 26 = L2;
25, 26 = L3;
etcalc = 1;
list = 2;
time = 0.01 to* 100000 by 10;
(* System reconfigures to AB duplex
(* 2nd fail while reconfigunng, system loss
(* 2nd fail while reconfigurmg, system loss
(* 2nd fail while reconfigurmg, system loss
(* 2rid fail while reconfigurlng, system loss
(* 2nd fail while reconfigurmg, system loss
(* 2nd fail while reconfigurmg, system loss
(* Duplex BC, Processor B fails
(* Duplex BC, Interstage B fails
(* Duplex BC, Processor C fails
(* Duplex BC, Interstage C fails
(* Duplex AC, Processor A fails
(* Duplex AC, Interstage A fails
(* Duplex AC, Processor C fails
(* Duplex AC, Interstage C fails
(* Duplex AB, Processor A fails
(* Duplex AB, Interstage A fails
(* Duplex AB, Processor B fails
(* Duplex AB, Interstage B fails
(* System reconfigures to simplex C
(* System reconfigures to simplex C
(* System reconfigures to simplex B
(* System reconfigures to simplex B
(* System reconfigures to simplex C
(* System reconfigures to simplex C
(* System reconfigures to simplex A
(* System reconfigures to simplex A
(* System reconfigures to simplex B
(* System reconfigures to simplex B
(* System reconfigures to simplex A
(* System reconfigures to simplex A
(* 3rd failure or unable to downgrade
(* 3rd failure or unable to downgrade
(* 3rd failure or unable to downgrade
(* 3rd failure or unable to downgrade
(* 3rd failure or unable to downgrade
(* 3rd failure or unable to downgrade
(* 3rd failure or unable to downgrade
(* 3rd failure or unable to downgrade
(* 3rd failure or unable to downgrade
(" 3rd failure or unable to downgrade
(* 3rd failure or unable to downgrade
(* 3rd failure or unable to downgrade
(* Processor A fails or unable to downgrade
(* Processor B fails or unable to downgrade
(* Processor C fails or unable to downgrade
*)
*)
*)
*)
*)
*)
*)
*)
*)
*)
*)
*)
*)
*)
-)
.)
*)
*)
*)
*)
*)
-)
*)
.)
*)
.)
D.2 SURE RESULTS
*)
*)
*)
*)
*)
*)
*)
.)
.)
*)
*)
-)
.)
*)
*)
*)
*)
*)
*)
-)
The following graph depicts the results obtained through the SURE Reliability
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Analysis Program. It represents the output for the FTP failure model.
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Figure D.1. Probability of an FTP Failure
D.3 COMPARISON OF SURE AND MARK 1 RESULTS
Figure D-2 shows a comparison of the SURE and MARK 1 results, which for all
practical purposes are identical. In fact, the results graph over each other.
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Figure D-2. SURE vs. MARK I FTP Failure Probability
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1553
1750
A/D
ADC
AIPS
A/RLAB
AS
Axx
BIU
CB
CDL
CHMOS
CMOS
CP
CPU
CPUCLK
CSDL
D/A
D/R
DAC
DAIS
DBF
DIP
DISF
DoD
DPU
DTC
MIL-STD-1553B Digital Time
Division Data Bus (Rev B)
MIL-STD-1750A Instruction
Set Architecture (Rev A)
Analog/Digi 
Analog-to-Digital Converter
Advanced Information
Processing System
NASA Langley's Avionics
Integration Research
Laboratory
Address Strobe
Address line xx
Bus Interface Unit
Channel Bus
Critical Device Loss
Complementary Hybrid Metal
Oxide Silicon
Complementary Metal Oxide
Silicon
Computational Processor
Central Processing Unit
Clock signal driving a CPU
Charles Stark Draper
Laboratory
Digital/Analog
Driver/Receiver
Digital-to-Analog Converter
Digital Avionics Instruction
Set
Double Bus Failure
Dual In-line Pin
Double Interface Single
Failure
Department of Defense
Data Processing Unit
Data Transfer Complete
Dxx Data line xx
ECS Environmental Control
System
ERV Entry Research Vehicle
FCR Fault Containment Region
FDIR Fault Detection, Isolation, and
Reconfiguration
FLOPS Floating Point Operations Per
Second
fph failures per hour
FPU Floating Point Unit
(aka FPCP)
FTC
FTP
G
GN&C
GPS
GSE
/,IO
ICB
IEEE
IF
IFTC
IMU
IOB
IOL
lOP
IPS
ISA
K
LaRC
LINS
Fault-Tolerant Clock
Fault-Tolerant Processor
109
Guidance, Navigation, and
Control
Global Positioning System
Ground Support Electronics
Input/Output
InterChannel Bus
Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers
Interface Failure
Interstage Fault-Tolerant
Clock
Inertial Measuring Unit
Input/Output Bus
Input/Output Loss
Input/Output Processor
Instructions Per Second
Instruction Set Architecture
10 3
Langley Research Center
Laser Inertial Navigation
System
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Xx
MLS
MMU
MPU
ms
NASA
navaid
NMOS
ns
PAL®
PC
PGA
PISO
PLD
PROM
PX
R-W
RAM
RCS
ROM
RTI
S/B
SBF
SEADS
SECDED
SIP
SIPO
SRAM
Failure rate for device X
Microwave Landing System
Memory Management Unit
Microprocessing Unit
millisecond
National Aeronautics and
Space Administration
navigation aid
n-channel Metal Oxide Silicon
nanosecond
Programmable Array Logic
Printed Circuit
Pin Grid Array
Parallel In Serial Out
Programmable Logic Device
Programmable Read Only
Memory
Probability of event X
occufing or probability of
being in state X
Read-Write
Random Access Memory
Reaction Control System
Read Only Memory
Remote Terminal Interface
Simplex Mode Bus Failure
Single Bus Failure
Shuttle Entry Air Data System
Single Error Correction,
Double Error Detection
Single In-line Pin
Serial In Parallel Out
Static Random Acess Memory
STS
Sx
TCL
TIDF
Space Transportation System
State X
Triplex Core Loss
Triple Interface Double
TIL
VHSIC
VL
VLSI
WSG
I.t
_ts
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Failure
Transistor-Transistor Logic
Very High Speed Integrated
Circuit
Vehicle Loss
Very Large Scale Integration
Wait-State Generator
Fault Recovery Rate
microsecond
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